[tor-bugs] #26137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon May 21 02:07:20 UTC 2018


#26137: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks                          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client traffic-   |  Actual Points:
  analysis path-selection                        |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > > This needs a proposal, and then it can go on the roadmap.
 >
 > I wasn't sure if it required a proposal since the code is already
 written and an analysis of the idea (implementation details rather than
 just raw code, etc) is present in the research paper.

 We require a proposal so that we specify precisely what the code is meant
 to do. Then we can write tests to ensure that's what the code actually
 does.

 Also, our experience of research code is that it often needs significant
 work to be suitable for long-term use on millions of tor clients.

 > > Any proposal should analyse the impact of related proposals,
 particularly 271 and 291:
 > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals
 > It would have no impact whatsoever on those proposals, since the AS-
 aware path selection does not depend on any particular guard rotation
 schedule. It will simply take into account what AS the guards are in when
 it selects the other two relays. This means it's also future-proofed for
 any changes to guard rotation behavior that happens down the road.

 I would encourage you to read the proposals and the relevant threads on
 the tor-dev mailing list.

 In particular, the "Eliminate path restrictions entirely" section of
 proposal 291 is relevant, because it conflicts with adding AS path
 restrictions:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013057.html

 > As someone who has never written a proposal for Tor, is there anything I
 can do to speed up the process? I have extensive experience in information
 security, but do not know the ins and outs of the Tor protocol itself or
 the proposal process, so I would not feel comfortable writing the proposal
 without knowing more about the general requirements (other than those
 described in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/001-process.txt
 001-process.txt]).

 We get a lot of proposals that are someone's first proposal.

 You could read proposal 291, and use it as a model to write a draft
 proposal. Then you can send it to the tor-dev mailing list, and ask for
 help improving it.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26137#comment:3>
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