[tor-bugs] #24486 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mark all bridges as up on application activity (was: Retry bridge descriptor downloads on application activity)

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Dec 1 22:40:50 UTC 2017


#24486: Mark all bridges as up on application activity
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                                 |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-bridge-client,       |  Actual Points:
  s8-errors                                      |
Parent ID:  #24367                               |         Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Old description:

> If circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() or its callers don't already retry
> bridge descriptor downloads, we should make them do so.
>
> A good way to do this is to:
> * modify the bridge state so we're using the bootstrapping schedule, then
> * reset the download statuses on all bridges.

New description:

 If circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() or its callers don't already mark all
 bridges as up, we should make them do so.

 A good way to do this is to:
 * modify the bridge state so we're using the bootstrapping schedule, then
 * reset the download statuses on all bridges, and
 * reset the guard state on all the bridges (?).

--

Comment (by teor):

 Fixed the description and title.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24486#comment:4>
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