[tor-bugs] #15621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire.

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#15621: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire.
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 Reporter:  yawning                    |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement                |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                     |      Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor               |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal                     |        Version:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201604  |     Resolution:
Parent ID:  #6418                      |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  asn                        |         Points:  small
                                       |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
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Comment (by nickm):

 Ack on NM1...NM2.  I think that for NM3, you're right, but we should add a
 tor_fragile_assert() there to make intent more clear.  (Or even
 tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached().)

 For NM4, the fingerprinting issue: The case I'm worried about is where we
 learn that an HS upgraded at the same time that some other view of the HS
 upgraded.  (eg, it's being used as a client too, and they're trying to
 keep the client identity separate from the HS identity, but both changes
 are observable.)  Am I being too paranoid here?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15621#comment:19>
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