[tor-bugs] #15621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire.

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Apr 19 21:40:36 UTC 2016


#15621: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire.
---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------
 Reporter:  yawning                    |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  enhancement                |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                     |      Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor               |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal                     |        Version:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201604  |     Resolution:
Parent ID:  #6418                      |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  asn                        |         Points:  small
                                       |        Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---------------------------------------+-----------------------------------

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:17 dgoulet]:
 > >  * NM4: I am concerned about fingerprinting attacks here. Do we have a
 good story about fingerprinting hidden services and their users as they
 upgrade, and why that will/won't matter?
 > Note that here it will _only_ indicate the the HS is at >= 0.2.9.0, no
 the exact version. Not sure what it can give to the attacker other than
 try to find an attack on that version? If this is a real issue, we'll have
 a hard time with users on 224 :).

 That was why we originally (comment:8) had in mind to do one switch,
 rather than several switches. That is, to do this change when we roll over
 to the next-gen design so there's only one partition.

 That said, I am increasingly a fan of just getting the coding done and not
 worrying too much about intermediate states for users (if that worrying
 means slowing everything else down). But I can definitely see both sides.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15621#comment:18>
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