[tor-bugs] #15254 [Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

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#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
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     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  reopened
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  SponsorR tor-hs stats
   Resolution:           |  TorCoreTeam201509 PostFreeze027
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
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Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:18 cypherpunks]:
 > Not qwerty1 here, but I could imagine scenarios where bandwidth
 anomalies could allow correlation (low-use relays have large bandwidth
 spikes).

 Right -- this is why we only aggregate stats when the relay is used in the
 'rendezvous point' position -- which does not know the onion service, does
 not know the client, and is picked transiently for just that one circuit.
 So there should be nothing to correlate it *to*, and even if there is, it
 shouldn't help anybody learn anything useful.

 > Is there anything to be gained by collecting stats from all nodes as
 opposed to collecting stats from the top 5-10% bandwidth nodes?

 Robustness of the result. Right now we are only guessing about how the
 millions of clients out there choose their paths. We don't know what Tor
 versions people are using, or whether there's some other implementation
 out there that chooses paths with different weights. And if things change,
 we won't know that either. Measuring all those other things, in order to
 be more confident that we only need the top relays here, seems like an
 unwise tradeoff.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:22>
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