[tor-bugs] #15254 [Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

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#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
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     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  reopened
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  SponsorR tor-hs stats
   Resolution:           |  TorCoreTeam201509 PostFreeze027
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
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Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
 > Similar to ExitPortStatistics, these involve examining and processing
 user-controlled data in ways that aren't necessary for normal operation.
 Similar to ExitPortStatistics (which aren't), they should not be enabled
 by default.

 This is an interesting one. I agree that not all stats should be on by
 default. This particular stat gets a lot of discussion in our 2010 paper:
 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wecsr10measuring-tor

 But I can also point to other stats, which are on by default, like the
 per-country client counts, or the per-country directory fetch counts, or
 the deciles for how long consensus fetches take to finish. I think the
 stats under discussion here are squarely in the latter category -- and
 probably quite a bit safer than some of the stats that we collect, and
 have collected basically forever.

 > Any reasonably imaginable use of these is satisfiable without having
 them on by default. In fact, for those purposes mentioned, a single
 approximate measurement is enough.

 Alas, I disagree with this part too. Having longitudinal answers is
 critical to knowing whether we're interpreting the data correctly, and to
 knowing whether external changes have affected these statistics.

 As just one example, when the botnet showed up in August 2013, my first
 thought was that the client count graph was broken or was being fed
 inaccurate data by some jerk who was just messing with our stats. But when
 I saw a corresponding increase in directory bytes
 (https://metrics.torproject.org/dirbytes.html) it became much more
 convincing that indeed we had an extra 5 million clients that week. And it
 turns out that the 'directory bytes fetched' graph has continued to be
 useful for us to understand the trends of the botnet after that month.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:23>
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