[tor-bugs] #2355 [Tor Client]: Change UseBridges to prevent any access attempts of public tor network

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#2355: Change UseBridges to prevent any access attempts of public tor network
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    Reporter:  anonym              |        Type:  defect    
      Status:  needs_review        |    Priority:  major     
   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final  |   Component:  Tor Client
     Version:                      |    Keywords:            
      Parent:                      |      Points:            
Actualpoints:                      |  
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Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:22 mikeperry]:
 > I think this is very important. Our poor configuration options and the
 lack of the ability to produce "Bridge Use Only" bundles is endangering
 people's lives in Syria, Iran, and elsewhere.
 >
 > It is very unlikely that new Tor users will configure things safely in
 these situations without prior training... They will just run our default
 TBBs, hit the firewall, and risk getting arrested for the attempt
 (especially if they appear to succeed later).

 Mike, can you explain why this is best solved inside Tor?

 I could imagine a Vidalia patch too, where it chooses not to Start Tor
 until you've answered its popup about bridges.

 Said another way, if only Tor changes, how are you planning to make the
 user-facing bundles do what you want? And if Vidalia changes, why not
 change it to do everything you want?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2355#comment:30>
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