[tbb-bugs] #14429 [Tor Browser]: Automated rounding of content window dimensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14429: Automated rounding of content window dimensions
---------------------------+-----------------------------------------------
     Reporter:             |      Owner:  tbb-team
  arthuredelstein          |     Status:  needs_revision
         Type:  defect     |  Milestone:
     Priority:  normal     |    Version:
    Component:  Tor        |   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-torbutton
  Browser                  |  Parent ID:
   Resolution:             |
Actual Points:             |
       Points:             |
---------------------------+-----------------------------------------------

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Nice idea. But I think it needs revision due to usability issues. See
 the attached screenshot for an example: This is a maximized window where
 essentially 1/3 of the browser window is grey and unusable despite the
 user wanting to have the maximum browser window possible on her screen.

 One possibility would be to take common set of maximized window dimensions
 and include these in a whitelist. Another thing we could add is that the
 window shrinks to the allowed dimensions after resizing finishes, to avoid
 wasting screen space with the dark gray background.

 > Similar things happen in fullscreen mode, e.g. I think denying the user
 to give her Tor Browser in fullscreen/maximized mode is just leading to
 frustration and switching to a different browser.

 I don't think usability should trump an easy path for de-anonymization.

 > The challenge here has never been to enforce rounding of a window by a
 certain multiple of, say 100. The challenge is to achieve that AND don't
 change how the browser looks like or behaves in important ways. I think a
 viable improvement would at least be if we would prompt a user *before*
 the window is actually maximized/in fullscreen mode (#7255) which we'd
 need anyway even if we don't take this patch but just make the user aware
 that she is about to shoot herself in the foot.

 I don't understand this approach. Why would we want to permit users to
 shoot themselves in the foot, even after a warning? Some users won't
 understand the warning and will get deanonymized. I think in practice, we
 should be protecting users from this easy and fatal mistake.

 Of course, it's not just maximizing or fullscreen that is dangerous -- any
 resizing is dangerous.

 > And, yes, zooming (#7256) is an interesting approach which might get us
 around all of the rounding issue...

 I agree that zooming could help cosmetically, but if the user resizes the
 window, trying to see more of a page, and the page zooms instead, that
 could be frustrating, too.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14429#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online