I have configured Tor with the following (with daily accounting):
RelayBandwidthRate 384 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 512 KB
I always assumed that the burst bandwidth will set the maximum relay bandwidth. However, by using iftop, I can see individual connections with speeds as high as 2+ Mbps. Even when individual connections are not exceeding burst speeds, adding up bandwidth of all connections would probably exceed allowed relay burst bandwidth.
Is this because Tor is using up the bandwidth allowance, since it is well below its long-time average or is this something unexpected that should not be happening?
Those settings are "kilobyte per second", so you're currently allowing 4 megabit per second as burst.
So unless there's many concurrent 2 Mbps connections, sounds ok.
Best regards, Alexander --- PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp
On 2014-02-08 15:28, Tora Tora Tora wrote:
I have configured Tor with the following (with daily accounting):
RelayBandwidthRate 384 KB RelayBandwidthBurst 512 KB
I always assumed that the burst bandwidth will set the maximum relay bandwidth. However, by using iftop, I can see individual connections with speeds as high as 2+ Mbps. Even when individual connections are not exceeding burst speeds, adding up bandwidth of all connections would probably exceed allowed relay burst bandwidth.
Is this because Tor is using up the bandwidth allowance, since it is well below its long-time average or is this something unexpected that should not be happening? _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Yes, sorry. I do know the difference between the two, but my morning coffee was not kicking in yet, and I was definitely not paying attention. Thanks for taking the time to point out my mistake.
On a similar subject, is there a way to limit Tor's "per connection" speed, i.e., not total speed. Assuming that a single connection carries only one "conversation" between two parties at a time, wouldn't limiting a single connection speed to, say 50-100Kb/s, act as deterrent for people transferring files--where speed matters more--rather than having private textual exchange, which should be adequate for anonymity and privacy reasons. Of course, if not uniformly implemented, it would create either botlenecks or allow someone to identify the possible routes, if not the data being transferred. Or is it a terrible idea for some other reason?
On 02/08/2014 10:28 AM, Alexander Dietrich wrote:
Those settings are "kilobyte per second", so you're currently allowing 4 megabit per second as burst.
So unless there's many concurrent 2 Mbps connections, sounds ok.
Best regards, Alexander
PGP Key: 0xC55A356B | https://dietrich.cx/pgp
On Sat, 08 Feb 2014 11:56:23 +0000, Tora Tora Tora wrote: ...
On a similar subject, is there a way to limit Tor's "per connection" speed, i.e., not total speed.
No.
Assuming that a single connection carries only one "conversation" between two parties at a time, wouldn't limiting a single connection speed to, say 50-100Kb/s,
Actually, what would that be good for? As long as a relay is so lightly loaded that the active connections each can have more than than, there is no point in throttling them, and as soon as there isn't, they're fair-share-throttled down below that anyway.
Andreas
...
Actually, what would that be good for? As long as a relay is so lightly loaded that the active connections each can have more than than, there is no point in throttling them, and as soon as there isn't, they're fair-share-throttled down below that anyway.
Uhm, my thought was to make Tor connections "unattractive" to file downloaders, e.g., P2P, by limit connection speed via Tor. No-one using email via Tor needs a fast connection, well, unless they send lots of huge attachments.
I guess I was thinking along the lines of someone having to "assemble" their P2P download out of 100-1000s of slow connections (if all Tor connections) vs using 10 fast connections, thus discouraging such use. P2P would be slower, yet others using the same relay *for anonymity/privacy* would not be affected as much. I am a Tor newbie, so probably need to understand better how Tor mixes up connections via relays, etc.
On Sat, Feb 08, 2014 at 10:41:21PM +0100, Andreas Krey wrote:
On Sat, 08 Feb 2014 11:56:23 +0000, Tora Tora Tora wrote: ...
On a similar subject, is there a way to limit Tor's "per connection" speed, i.e., not total speed.
No.
Actually there is:
PerConnBWRate N bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|KBits|MBits|GBits If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWBurst N bytes|KBytes|MBytes|GBytes|KBits|MBits|GBits If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
Assuming that a single connection carries only one "conversation" between two parties at a time, wouldn't limiting a single connection speed to, say 50-100Kb/s,
Actually, what would that be good for? As long as a relay is so lightly loaded that the active connections each can have more than than, there is no point in throttling them, and as soon as there isn't, they're fair-share-throttled down below that anyway.
I claim there is a point to throttling even when the guard node has spare capacity. I explained it in: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-adaptive-throttling-tor-cl...
And then two research groups answered it (in part) here: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#acsac11-tortoise http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#throttling-sec12
But then see: http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#pets13-how-low for how all of these proposed fairness / throttling algorithms can be trickier for anonymity than we first thought.
I'd like to turn on this per-conn static (not adaptive) throttling network-wide: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9368 but that's blocking on merging https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9762 but nobody has reviewed aagbsn's patch in #9762.
Whew, --Roger
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org