Hi,
to reduce the risk that your multi-instance tor relay setup triggers false-positive filter thresholds on other relays, I recommend you make use of the OutboundBindAddress (or OutboundBindAddressOR) option and set it to the same IP as in the ORPort line.
This will ensure that the outbound source IP will be the same when connecting to relays. The man page is not clear what tor's default without that setting is but I guess that would leave it to the OS to pick the source IP and that could result in all your tor's using the same source IP.
relayor users are covered by default, no further action required. https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor/blob/2bc62d62f85b62c51a38d9caa893a...
kind regards, nusenu
Am Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:08:39 +0100 schrieb nusenu nusenu-lists@riseup.net:
Hi
multi-instance tor relay
Can you please describe what that is? Is it a server with multiple relays, each with it's own fingerprint? Or is it a relay with one fingerprint and with multiple tor daemons that are synced by some magic?
multi-instance tor relay
Can you please describe what that is?
The subject uses the more correct term 'multi-instance tor server'.
A single OS running more than one tor relay instance.
In the context of this email, more specifically running more than 2 tor relays.
kind regards, nusenu
Hi nusenu
I'm considering not setting OutboundBindAddress on the dotsrc exit relays ( https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/dotsrc). Wouldn't it be better if all outgoing connections came from the same IP (i.e do not set OutboundBindAddress), for the sake of making correlation analysis harder? Say you observe an exit connection to example.com:443. If all the dotsrc relays used 185.129.61.1 as src IP, you couldn't tell which of our relays made the connection.
On a related note, wrt ongoing ddos, here's something that might be useful to exit relay operators: What we observed, was tens of thousands open exit connections to a few IP (at one point our server had more than 500.000 open connections to those hosts!). To check if you see the same, here's a one liner to show you the endpoints with the largest number of connections from your server: # ss -tn | tr -s ' ' | cut -d' ' -f 5 | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head
One way to solve this, is to do some firewall foo, but I really don't like connection tracking (unnecessary CPU cycles). An alternative solution that works great for us, is to lower the net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range from the default of about 30.000 ports. E.g: # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="64000 65535" This limits the number of connections you can have to a specific dst tuple (IP, Port) to 1.535 connections (and thanks to Tor now setting IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT, reaching this limit won't affect any other connections as the same port can be used as src for many different dst IPs).
- Anders
On Sat, Feb 11, 2023 at 12:12 PM nusenu nusenu-lists@riseup.net wrote:
multi-instance tor relay
Can you please describe what that is?
The subject uses the more correct term 'multi-instance tor server'.
A single OS running more than one tor relay instance.
In the context of this email, more specifically running more than 2 tor relays.
kind regards, nusenu
-- https://nusenu.github.io _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Hi Anders,
I'm considering not setting OutboundBindAddress on the dotsrc exit relays ( https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/dotsrc). Wouldn't it be better if all outgoing connections came from the same IP (i.e do not set OutboundBindAddress), for the sake of making correlation analysis harder? Say you observe an exit connection to example.com:443. If all the dotsrc relays used 185.129.61.1 as src IP, you couldn't tell which of our relays made the connection.
There are two settings that can help you with achieving both goals at the same time:
* use the inbound IP for connections to other relays: OutboundBindAddressOR * use a single source IP for connections exiting the network: OutboundBindAddressExit
there are other points to consider though: if all users exit through the same IP, will the web become less accessible for tor users because one bad user ruined the IP reputation for all users?
On a related note, wrt ongoing ddos, here's something that might be useful to exit relay operators: What we observed, was tens of thousands open exit connections to a few IP
This is a known issue and there are issues on gitlab.tpo for it and 3rd party tools for exit operators.
One way to solve this, is to do some firewall foo, but I really don't like connection tracking (unnecessary CPU cycles). An alternative solution that works great for us, is to lower the net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range from the default of about 30.000 ports. E.g: # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="64000 65535"
I don't think that it is a good approach to set such a low hard limit for connections to any single destination.
kind regards, nusenu
On Sat, 11 Feb 2023 11:16:33 +0100 Felix zwiebel@quantentunnel.de wrote:
Am Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:08:39 +0100 schrieb nusenu nusenu-lists@riseup.net:
Hi
multi-instance tor relay
Can you please describe what that is? Is it a server with multiple relays, each with it's own fingerprint? Or is it a relay with one fingerprint and with multiple tor daemons that are synced by some magic?
Seeing how the git repo mentions MyFamily management, I believe it's just #1 in this case.
I remember reading someone describe their setup of #2, with a TCP load balancer in front of multiple Tor instances all using the same fingerprint. Outright my reaction was that this is fundamentally broken and cannot work, but apparently it does. Still, IMO that's easy to get wrong and unknowingly degrade the network quality for Tor users.
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
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Anders Trier Olesen -
Felix -
nusenu -
Roman Mamedov