Hi Gary,

wait, your Relays are BadMiddle Nodes! It breaks at least all onion features. Thanks for trying to saturate the connection by balancing the single-core tor bottleneck.

But think of any client try to establish RendezvousPoints or IntroductionPoints or fetch HsDir with one of your tor instances that all have same descriptor and look same to outside.

It will result into fail the connection!

1. a_tor_client => HAProxy server tornode41 192.168.0.41:9001 => RendezvousCookie 46B9FA5B onionservice => HAProxy server tornode51 192.168.0.41:9001 => RendezvousCookie 46B9FA5B

2. tornode51 does not know cookies of tornode41 will: [WARN] Rejecting RENDEZVOUS1 cell with unrecognized rendezvous cookie 46B9FA5B. Didn't recognize cell, but circ stops here circuit_receive_relay_cell (forward) failed

This Loadbalancing setup is only valid and usefull for Bridges or ExitNode relay roles. Not for any that have MiddlePropability consensusweigths.

just FYI

David, Roger, et al.,

I just got back from holidays and really enjoyed this thread!

I run my Loadbalanced Tor Relay as a Guard/Middle Relay, very similar

to David's topology diagram, without the Snoflake-Server proxy. I'm using Nginx (which forks a child process per core) instead of HAProxy. My Backend Tor Relay Nodes are running on several, different Physical Servers; thus, I'm using Private Address Space instead of Loopback Address Space.

In this configuration, I discovered that I had to configure

Nginix/HAProxy to use Transparent Streaming Mode, use Source IP Address Sticky Sessions (Pinning), configure the Loadbalancer to send the Backend Tor Relay Nodes' traffic back to Nginx/HAProxy (Kernel & IPTables), configure all Backend Tor Relay Nodes to use a copy of the same .tordb (I wasn't able to get the Backend Tor Relay Nodes working with the same .tordb (over NFS) without the DirectoryAuthorities complaining), and configure the Backend Tor Relay Nodes to use the same DirectoryAuthority (to ensure each Backend Tor Relay Node sends Meta-Data to the same DirectoryAuthority). Moreover, I've enabled logging to a central Syslog Server for each Backend Tor Relay Node and created a number of Shell Scripts to help remotely manage each Backend Tor Relay Node.

Here are some sample configurations for reference.

Nginx Config:

upstream orport_tornodes { #least_conn; hash $remote_addr consistent; #server 192.168.0.1:9001 weight=1 max_fails=1 fail_timeout=10s; #server 192.168.0.1:9001 down; server 192.168.0.11:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; server 192.168.0.21:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; #server 192.168.0.31:9001 weight=4 max_fails=3 fail_timeout=300s; server 192.168.0.41:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; server 192.168.0.51:9001 weight=4 max_fails=0 fail_timeout=0s; #zone orport_torfarm 64k;

HAProxy Config (Alternate):

frontend tornodes # Log to global config log global

# Bind to port 443 on a specified interface bind 0.0.0.0:9001 transparent

# We're proxying TCP here... mode tcp

default_backend orport_tornodes

# Simple TCP source consistent over several servers using the specified # source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip backend orport_tornodes

balance source hash-type consistent #server tornode1 192.168.0.1:9001 check disabled #server tornode11 192.168.0.11:9001 source 192.168.0.1 server tornode11 192.168.0.11:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip

check disabled

server tornode21 192.168.0.21:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip

check disabled

#server tornode31 192.168.0.31:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip

check disabled

server tornode41 192.168.0.41:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip

check disabled

server tornode51 192.168.0.51:9001 source 0.0.0.0 usesrc clientip

check disabled

Linux Kernel & IPTables Config:

modprobe xt_socket modprobe xt_TPROXY

echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward; cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_nonlocal_bind; cat

/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_nonlocal_bind

echo 15000 64000 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range; cat

/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range

ip rule del fwmark 1 lookup 100 2>/dev/null # Ensure Duplicate Rule

is not Created

ip rule add fwmark 1 lookup 100 # ip rule show ip route add local 0.0.0.0/0 dev lo table 100 # ip route show table

wan0; ip route show table 100

iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 9001 -j ACCEPT iptables -t mangle -N TOR iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp -m socket -j TOR iptables -t mangle -A TOR -j MARK --set-mark 1 iptables -t mangle -A TOR -j ACCEPT #iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp -s 192.168.0.0/24 --sport

9001 -j MARK --set-xmark 0x1/0xffffffff

#iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 9001 -j TPROXY

--tproxy-mark 0x1/0x1 --on-port 9001 --on-ip 127.0.0.1

Backend Tor Relay Node Configs:

# cat /tmp/torrc Nickname xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ORPort xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:9001 NoListen ORPort 192.168.0.11:9001 NoAdvertise SocksPort 9050 SocksPort 192.168.0.11:9050 ControlPort 9051 DirAuthority longclaw orport=443 no-v2

v3ident=23D15D965BC35114467363C165C4F724B64B4F66 199.58.81.140:80 74A910646BCEEFBCD2E874FC1DC997430F968145

FallbackDir 193.23.244.244:80 orport=443

id=7BE683E65D48141321C5ED92F075C55364AC7123

DirCache 0 ExitRelay 0 MaxMemInQueues 192 MB GeoIPFile /opt/share/tor/geoip Log notice file /tmp/torlog Log notice syslog VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10 AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 TransPort 192.168.0.11:9040 DNSPort 192.168.0.11:9053 RunAsDaemon 1 DataDirectory /tmp/tor/torrc.d/.tordb AvoidDiskWrites 1 User tor ContactInfo tor-operator at your-emailaddress-domain

# cat /tmp/torrc Nickname xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ORPort xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:9001 NoListen ORPort 192.168.0.41:9001 NoAdvertise SocksPort 9050 SocksPort 192.168.0.41:9050 ControlPort 9051 DirAuthority longclaw orport=443 no-v2

v3ident=23D15D965BC35114467363C165C4F724B64B4F66 199.58.81.140:80 74A910646BCEEFBCD2E874FC1DC997430F968145

FallbackDir 193.23.244.244:80 orport=443

id=7BE683E65D48141321C5ED92F075C55364AC7123

DirCache 0 ExitRelay 0 MaxMemInQueues 192 MB GeoIPFile /opt/share/tor/geoip Log notice file /tmp/torlog Log notice syslog VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10 AutomapHostsOnResolve 1 TransPort 192.168.0.41:9040 DNSPort 192.168.0.41:9053 RunAsDaemon 1 DataDirectory /tmp/tor/torrc.d/.tordb AvoidDiskWrites 1 User tor ContactInfo tor-operator at your-emailaddress-domain

Shell Scripts to Remotely Manage Tor Relay Nodes:

# cat /usr/sbin/stat-tor-nodes #!/bin/sh uptime-all-nodes; memfree-all-nodes; netstat-tor-nodes

# cat /usr/sbin/uptime-all-nodes #!/bin/sh /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; uptime' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; uptime' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; uptime' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; uptime' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; uptime'

# cat /usr/sbin/memfree-all-nodes #!/bin/sh /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; grep MemFree

/proc/meminfo'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; grep MemFree

/proc/meminfo'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; grep MemFree

/proc/meminfo'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; grep MemFree

/proc/meminfo'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; grep MemFree

/proc/meminfo'

# cat /usr/sbin/netstat-tor-nodes #!/bin/sh /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep

-i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep

-i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep

-i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep

-i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; netstat -anp | grep

-i tor | grep -v 192.168.0.1: | wc -l'

# cat /jffs/sbin/ps-tor-nodes #!/bin/sh /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'hostname; ps w | grep -i tor'

# cat /usr/sbin/killall-tor-nodes #!/bin/sh read -r -p "Are you sure? [y/N] " input case "$input" in [yY]) /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 'killall tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 'killall tor' #/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 'killall tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 'killall tor' /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 'killall tor' return 0 ;; *) return 1 ;; esac

# cat /usr/sbin/restart-tor-nodes #!/bin/sh read -r -p "Are you sure? [y/N] " input case "$input" in [yY]) /usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.11 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc

--quiet'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.21 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc

--quiet'

#/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.31 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc

--quiet'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.41 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc

--quiet'

/usr/bin/ssh -t admin at 192.168.0.51 '/usr/sbin/tor -f /tmp/torrc

--quiet'

return 0 ;; *) return 1 ;; esac

I've been meaning to put together a tutorial on Loadbalancing Tor

Relays, but haven't found the time as of yet. Perhaps, this will help, until I am able to find the time.

I appreciate your knowledge sharing and for furthering the topic of

Loadbalancing Tor Relays; especially, with regard to Bridging and Exit Relays.

Keep up the Great Work!

Respectfully,

Gary On Tuesday, January 4, 2022, 09:57:52 PM MST, Roger Dingledine

<arma at torproject.org> wrote:

[I'm about to go off-line for some days, so I am sending my current suboptimally-organized reply, which I hope is better than waiting another week to respond :)]

On Thu, Dec 30, 2021 at 10:42:51PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:

...

Let's make a distinction between the "frontend" snowflake-server pluggable transport process, and the "backend" tor process. These don't necessarily have to be 1:1; either one could be run in multiple instances. Currently, the "backend" tor is the limiting factor, because it uses only 1 CPU core. The "frontend" snowflake-server can scale to multiple cores in a single process and is comparatively unrestrained.

Excellent point, and yes this simplifies. Great.

...

I believe that the "pinning" of a client session to particular tor instance will work automatically by the fact that snowflake-server

keeps

...

an outgoing connection alive (i.e., through the load balancer) as long as a KCP session exists. [...] But before starting the second instance the first time, copy keys from the first instance:

Hm. It looks promising! But we might still have a Tor-side problem remaining. I think it boils down to how long the KCP sessions last.

The details on how exactly these bridge instances will diverge over time:

The keys directory will start out the same, but after four weeks (DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS, used to be one week but in Tor 0.3.1.1-alpha, proposal 274, we bumped it up to four weeks) each bridge will rotate its onion key (the one clients use for circuit-level crypto). That is, each instance will generate its own fresh onion key.

The two bridge instances actually haven't diverged completely at that point, since Tor remembers the previous onion key (i.e. the onion key from the previous period) and is willing to receive create cells that use it for one further week (DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS). So it is after 5 weeks that the original (shared) onion key will no longer

work.

Where this matters is (after this 5 weeks have passed) if the client connects to the bridge, fetches and caches the bridge descriptor of instance A, and then later it connects to the bridge again and gets passed to instance B. In this case, the create cell that the client generates will use the onion key for instance A, and instance B won't know how to decrypt it so it will send a destroy cell back.

If this is an issue, we can definitely work around it, by e.g. disabling the onion key rotation on the bridges, or setting up a periodic rsync+hup between the bridges, or teaching clients to use createfast cells in this situation (this type of circuit crypto doesn't use the onion key at all, and just relies on TLS for security -- which can only be done for the first hop of the circuit but that's the one we're talking about here).

But before we think about workarounds, maybe we don't need one: how long does "the KCP session" last?

Tor clients try to fetch a fresh bridge descriptor every three-ish hours, and once they fetch a bridge descriptor from their "current" bridge instance, they should know the onion key that it wants to use. So it is that up-to-three-hour window where I think things could go wrong. And that timeframe sounds promising.

(I also want to double-check that clients don't try to use the onion key from the current cached descriptor while fetching the updated descriptor. That could become an ugly bug in the wrong circumstances, and would be something we want to fix if it's happening.)

Here's how you can simulate a pair of bridge instances that have diverged after five weeks, so you can test how things would work with them:

Copy the keys directory as before, but "rm secret_onion_key*" in the keys directory on n-1 of the instances, before starting them.)

Thanks! --Roger