Strange BGP activity with my node
Hi, I just a notification from my data center that someone is trying to hijack the IP of my exit node. Seems like the sort of thing someone might do when trying to attack Tor. I'm in a very remote area with limited access but any suggestions on actions I should take? ==================================================================== Possible Prefix Hijack (Code: 10) ==================================================================== Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19: Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) ASpath: 200005 https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=383d6e34d9bea92e97092b13... Thanks, --Trevor
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Dear Trevor,
I just a notification from my data center that someone is trying to hijack the IP of my exit node. Seems like the sort of thing someone might do when trying to attack Tor. I'm in a very remote area with limited access but any suggestions on actions I should take?
====================================================================
Possible Prefix Hijack (Code: 10)
====================================================================
Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19 <http://204.17.32.0/19>:
Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 <http://204.17.56.42/32> Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) ASpath: 200005
I took a look through our BGP data and peering routers, and I didn't see the /32 being announced. I'm not saying it didn't happen, but rather it may not have carried very far. /32 prefix announcements rarely propagate very far. There are still a great many filters in place that restrict announcements more specific than /24 (or /21, or /19, or ...). It may be the case that this /32 prefix is a null route that leaked out, which we've seen happen somewhat frequently. The most notorious example was an attempted, and unwittingly leaked, null route in Pakistan (/24s, IIRC) that impacted YouTube. It appears Asavie does a bit of security and networking work, so possibly this is attributable to that? Be well, Rabbi Rob. - -- Rabbi Rob Thomas Team Cymru "It is easy to believe in freedom of speech for those with whom we agree." - Leo McKern -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEDcVjavXj08cL/QwdQ+hhYvqF8o0FAlrzQasACgkQQ+hhYvqF 8o0OUw//Z230dJMUxxYlBWuopk2C0/zWmAMSaHBSHLugfEaG+wx1c1qLkPj/Sxtu aNV3u/GFl3GMtfcFSci4T7VGd5Q97QMctbjfdaKLtjodoNXh7341OsATqpToAq4X F7aU5TXQSayyW3iGA5HBeVJJ8RlG0wZX5Ute15iwOrpeKb0NfqGoC6pfdJVvxyt0 xyM3USg+9jWIA+11xgyw9T4Phs4sWvdlRAqLRXfUkvFok5sNLRXEx1jKhcOz9Wt6 M79Q7GUZbddijhjfJ5waZletscXa2ZjsvwESLqRotux2oK8WjVwb1JKvVo+zEcL+ pbF35jehoR1ROBqJclS465y08gugmnkTldhxRWyf24gvytYKi33qPtNNZ5Yn0gsv 7LU2qbQVectJURue8ULLD8iap3C2Gt8CYg6DBBnEYQejKpcpiCzTw+v+t+vlswgq 13jPrC2MpwjzrhCwNSgcfoFWGeERlsgovNyONcDOfozyn570zpjZrQBpogsCt0z1 g13kS0jAQ1KutDt7HFv8k2mw3pHi/DvLbpv9CsVwAFzY2dTwjc5Mr0n4L7yQI2Yd VY9pjOeXnDk+K+b+fiIh9TzofvxKgVVzjZlqTwGlx1fKkfxnc/gZK1XSE9GMqAER 4jSvYWxqi83X4T6BW17OAeaUW1SiDIbkWe7uziWmqeNyDsmlcVo= =SZWZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19 <http://204.17.32.0/19>:
Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 <http://204.17.56.42/32> Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) ASpath: 200005
I took a look through our BGP data and peering routers, and I didn't see the /32 being announced. I'm not saying it didn't happen, but rather it may not have carried very far. /32 prefix announcements rarely propagate very far. There are still a great many filters in place that restrict announcements more specific than /24 (or /21, or /19, or ...).
"#peers: 1" indicates only one of the peers with bgpmon.net saw it.
It may be the case that this /32 prefix is a null route that leaked out, which we've seen happen somewhat frequently. The most notorious example was an attempted, and unwittingly leaked, null route in Pakistan (/24s, IIRC) that impacted YouTube.
It appears Asavie does a bit of security and networking work, so possibly this is attributable to that?
DFRI saw the same notification for one exit address at the exact same time. We also got a second identical notfication at 2018-05-09 12:17 (UTC). Regards, Johan
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 2:06 PM, Trevor Ellermann <trevor@ellermann.net> wrote:
I just a notification from my data center that someone is trying to hijack the IP of my exit node. Seems like the sort of thing someone might do when trying to attack Tor. I'm in a very remote area with limited access but any suggestions on actions I should take?
Make sure your box and keys aren't compromised. If that's ok, best they can do if the announcements are listened to is camp on the ip for a while using their own keys, (there might be some identification attacks made possible with such a transient reroute,) circuits would fail till the consensus updated to them, but there could be some duplicate ip split horizon issues involved due to filtering. If they hacked the boxes there's hardly need to expend noisy reroutes when they can do most attacks using the box itself. Hop on the route servers or your other favorite interfaces to the net and analyze who all is announcing /32's trying to cover any other tor nodes. Sane isp's will filter such things without prior coordination. It's fairly rare, and for them to bother giving customers courtesy reports. Though depending on nature of ticket / relationship with GBLX, you might want to reply saying you've never worked with Asavie and don't approve of the action regarding your IP. You can also search AS200005 to see what kind of heat they catch from other operators / internet analysis tools.
==================================================================== Possible Prefix Hijack (Code: 10) ==================================================================== Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19: Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) ASpath: 200005
https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=383d6e34d9bea92e97092b13...
Thanks for the responses. To follow up this is how the offending ISP responded to our inquiries. I do not believe any further follow up is necessary. *snip* Thank you for getting in touch. I am afraid an engineer made an error in the BGP configuration of one of our devices earlier this afternoon, which resulted in a number a host routes being inadvertently announced to certain of our upstream providers. The route itself existed as part of a set of prefixes internally routed to null on our network. This particular IP hosts a TOR relay node, and while that is perfectly legitimate we have a business requirement to block access to these internally: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/ 383D6E34D9BEA92E97092B134A708EEF476DF2E4 The route should never have been announced outside our own AS. Unfortunately due to human error it was advertised earlier today (May 9th) from approx. 11:04 to 11:10 UTC. I can assure you this was an unintentional error, we had no desire to interrupt or affect communications outside our AS. The mistake was quickly spotted by our own NOC team and reverted. I hope you can accept our sincere apologies for this issue, we have taken steps to ensure that any similar mistake will not have such impact in future. *snip* On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 11:54 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 2:06 PM, Trevor Ellermann <trevor@ellermann.net> wrote:
I just a notification from my data center that someone is trying to hijack the IP of my exit node. Seems like the sort of thing someone might do when trying to attack Tor. I'm in a very remote area with limited access but any suggestions on actions I should take?
Make sure your box and keys aren't compromised. If that's ok, best they can do if the announcements are listened to is camp on the ip for a while using their own keys, (there might be some identification attacks made possible with such a transient reroute,) circuits would fail till the consensus updated to them, but there could be some duplicate ip split horizon issues involved due to filtering. If they hacked the boxes there's hardly need to expend noisy reroutes when they can do most attacks using the box itself.
Hop on the route servers or your other favorite interfaces to the net and analyze who all is announcing /32's trying to cover any other tor nodes.
Sane isp's will filter such things without prior coordination. It's fairly rare, and for them to bother giving customers courtesy reports. Though depending on nature of ticket / relationship with GBLX, you might want to reply saying you've never worked with Asavie and don't approve of the action regarding your IP.
You can also search AS200005 to see what kind of heat they catch from other operators / internet analysis tools.
==================================================================== Possible Prefix Hijack (Code: 10) ==================================================================== Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19: Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) ASpath: 200005
https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=383d6e34 d9bea92e97092b134a708eef476df2e4
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
in the current state of society with certain governmental agencies performing things the way they are, i don't trust any ISP anymore or government agency anymore. the apology from that ISP, in my opinion, smells like the worst pile of crap ever. i don't buy it. i wish there was a way for us to run a TOR network without having to be on an ISP's network. On 05/14/2018 10:39 AM, Trevor Ellermann wrote:
Thanks for the responses. To follow up this is how the offending ISP responded to our inquiries. I do not believe any further follow up is necessary.
*snip* Thank you for getting in touch.
I am afraid an engineer made an error in the BGP configuration of one of our devices earlier this afternoon, which resulted in a number a host routes being inadvertently announced to certain of our upstream providers.
The route itself existed as part of a set of prefixes internally routed to null on our network. This particular IP hosts a TOR relay node, and while that is perfectly legitimate we have a business requirement to block access to these internally:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/383D6E34D9BEA92E97092B134A708... <https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/383D6E34D9BEA92E97092B134A708EEF476DF2E4>
The route should never have been announced outside our own AS. Unfortunately due to human error it was advertised earlier today (May 9th) from approx. 11:04 to 11:10 UTC. I can assure you this was an unintentional error, we had no desire to interrupt or affect communications outside our AS. The mistake was quickly spotted by our own NOC team and reverted.
I hope you can accept our sincere apologies for this issue, we have taken steps to ensure that any similar mistake will not have such impact in future. *snip*
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 11:54 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com <mailto:grarpamp@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 2:06 PM, Trevor Ellermann <trevor@ellermann.net <mailto:trevor@ellermann.net>> wrote: > I just a notification from my data center that someone is trying to hijack > the IP of my exit node. Seems like the sort of thing someone might do when > trying to attack Tor. I'm in a very remote area with limited access but any > suggestions on actions I should take?
Make sure your box and keys aren't compromised. If that's ok, best they can do if the announcements are listened to is camp on the ip for a while using their own keys, (there might be some identification attacks made possible with such a transient reroute,) circuits would fail till the consensus updated to them, but there could be some duplicate ip split horizon issues involved due to filtering. If they hacked the boxes there's hardly need to expend noisy reroutes when they can do most attacks using the box itself.
Hop on the route servers or your other favorite interfaces to the net and analyze who all is announcing /32's trying to cover any other tor nodes.
Sane isp's will filter such things without prior coordination. It's fairly rare, and for them to bother giving customers courtesy reports. Though depending on nature of ticket / relationship with GBLX, you might want to reply saying you've never worked with Asavie and don't approve of the action regarding your IP.
You can also search AS200005 to see what kind of heat they catch from other operators / internet analysis tools.
> ==================================================================== > Possible Prefix Hijack (Code: 10) > ==================================================================== > Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19 <http://204.17.32.0/19>: > Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP > Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) > Detected by #peers: 1 > Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 <http://204.17.56.42/32> > Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) > Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) > ASpath: 200005 > > > https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=383d6e34d9bea92e97092b13... <https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=383d6e34d9bea92e97092b134a708eef476df2e4> _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org <mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays>
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 2:19 PM, charlie <contact@charlieluna.com> wrote:
in the current state of society with certain governmental agencies performing things the way they are, i don't trust any ISP anymore or government agency anymore. the apology from that ISP, in my opinion, smells like the worst pile of crap ever. i don't buy it.
i wish there was a way for us to run a TOR network without having to be on an ISP's network.
!gnitsop pot potS That being said... There are many ways... - Start laying fiber / wifi to your neighbors, guerrilla networking, create your own new global internets with your own new rules - CJDNS, I2P, GNUnet, Tor, messaging ... all the various anonymous encrypted overlays... they are their own "non ISP networks"... run your own services on them, they're likely better than nothing. - Do you really need to be giving Alexa Top 100 access to your life and asshole... especially anymore now that decentralized models and software are rolling out... As far as this BGP event, as someone noted earlier, commercial [subscription based] "security" services deploy many potential means for themselves and their customers, including acting within their routing infrastructures, to blackhole / filter / snoop traffic destined to external risks deemed. No different than adblock, "hosts" files, etc. So long as it's not default deny, packets can still get out, somewhere, to the equivalent of bridges / vpn's / proxies as need be. Their explanation is within plausible ops legitimacy. As is questioning trust in aforesaid entities... you certainly can't do an inspection on either of them, yet you still give them your dollars. That's quite funny. Again, more interesting would be looking for and analysing attacks against the tor nodes (and those of other networks) as a whole. Unfortunately no one's researched that yet here. Perhaps because Tor [izens] keeps shouting "sniffing bad", thus programming out one of the tech needed to do that. And other attacks, such as potential bgp steering, sybils, the network paths, etc, are also less discussed [1]. Or because coordination is hard. Oh well... Demons lurk where Sun never peeks. At least tor doesn't use dns to bootstrap and run, that would be a whole other layer of attack surface. [1] For example, after years of mentions, there's still no voluntary meetup PKI WoT cross certification / inspection / identification, statistical / checklist, jurisdiction / AS / location, whatever else, based node analysis and selection project to which users could potentially subscribe their clients to. All networks to date still use effectively random free-for-all node selection. That's reasonable in some threat models, but without the research and attempted construction and deployment of alternate selection models operating voluntarily in parallel... it's quite possibly a lurkers paradise.
On 05/14/2018 10:39 AM, Trevor Ellermann wrote:
Thanks for the responses. To follow up this is how the offending ISP responded to our inquiries. I do not believe any further follow up is necessary.
*snip* Thank you for getting in touch.
I am afraid an engineer made an error in the BGP configuration of one of our devices earlier this afternoon, which resulted in a number a host routes being inadvertently announced to certain of our upstream providers.
The route itself existed as part of a set of prefixes internally routed to null on our network. This particular IP hosts a TOR relay node, and while that is perfectly legitimate we have a business requirement to block access to these internally:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/383D6E34D9BEA92E97092B134A708...
The route should never have been announced outside our own AS. Unfortunately due to human error it was advertised earlier today (May 9th) from approx. 11:04 to 11:10 UTC. I can assure you this was an unintentional error, we had no desire to interrupt or affect communications outside our AS. The mistake was quickly spotted by our own NOC team and reverted.
I hope you can accept our sincere apologies for this issue, we have taken steps to ensure that any similar mistake will not have such impact in future. *snip*
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 11:54 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 2:06 PM, Trevor Ellermann <trevor@ellermann.net> wrote:
I just a notification from my data center that someone is trying to hijack the IP of my exit node. Seems like the sort of thing someone might do when trying to attack Tor. I'm in a very remote area with limited access but any suggestions on actions I should take?
Make sure your box and keys aren't compromised. If that's ok, best they can do if the announcements are listened to is camp on the ip for a while using their own keys, (there might be some identification attacks made possible with such a transient reroute,) circuits would fail till the consensus updated to them, but there could be some duplicate ip split horizon issues involved due to filtering. If they hacked the boxes there's hardly need to expend noisy reroutes when they can do most attacks using the box itself.
Hop on the route servers or your other favorite interfaces to the net and analyze who all is announcing /32's trying to cover any other tor nodes.
Sane isp's will filter such things without prior coordination. It's fairly rare, and for them to bother giving customers courtesy reports. Though depending on nature of ticket / relationship with GBLX, you might want to reply saying you've never worked with Asavie and don't approve of the action regarding your IP.
You can also search AS200005 to see what kind of heat they catch from other operators / internet analysis tools.
==================================================================== Possible Prefix Hijack (Code: 10) ==================================================================== Your prefix: 204.17.32.0/19: Prefix Description: GBLX-US-BGP Update time: 2018-05-09 12:11 (UTC) Detected by #peers: 1 Detected prefix: 204.17.56.42/32 Announced by: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) Upstream AS: AS200005 (Asavie Technologies Limited) ASpath: 200005
https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=383d6e34d9bea92e97092b13...
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
participants (5)
-
charlie -
grarpamp -
Johan Nilsson -
Rabbi Rob Thomas -
Trevor Ellermann