New OrNetStats Section: Largest Bridge Operators

Hi, OrNetStats got a new section today showing the largest bridge operators by advertised bandwidth grouped by ContactInfo: https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/#bridge-operators-grouped-by-contactinfo This is possible because the Torproject started to publish bridge ContactInfos. The listing only includes operators with at least 50 Mbit/s aggregated advertised bandwidth. AROI support for bridges You can also protect your bridge ContactInfo against spoofing now. The same fields as for relays apply. If you have setup your AROI [1] on your relays already you can simply copy the ContactInfo to your bridges and publish the list of hashed bridge fingerprints under this URL: https://-your-hostname-/.well-known/tor-relay/hashed-bridge-rsa-fingerprint.... After successful validation your bridges will be added to your operator level pages on OrNetStats. OrNetRadar will also be extended to support bridges. kind regards, nusenu [1] https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/#authenticated-relay-operator-ids -- https://nusenu.github.io

On Sunday, May 29, 2022 6:25:02 PM CEST nusenu wrote:
AROI support for bridges
You can also protect your bridge ContactInfo against spoofing now. The same fields as for relays apply. If you have setup your AROI [1] on your relays already you can simply copy the ContactInfo to your bridges and publish the list of hashed bridge fingerprints under this URL:
https://-your-hostname-/.well-known/tor-relay/hashed-bridge-rsa-fingerprint. txt
Oh nice, thanks. I just saw that nusenu also thought of us 'proof:dns-rsa' users. ;-) https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#dns-... For bridges: hashed-fingerprint.example.com value: “we-run-this-tor-bridge” -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom!

the bridge may just should not run on the IP the second level domain A / AAAA resolves to. lists@for-privacy.net:
On Sunday, May 29, 2022 6:25:02 PM CEST nusenu wrote:
AROI support for bridges
You can also protect your bridge ContactInfo against spoofing now. The same fields as for relays apply. If you have setup your AROI [1] on your relays already you can simply copy the ContactInfo to your bridges and publish the list of hashed bridge fingerprints under this URL:
https://-your-hostname-/.well-known/tor-relay/hashed-bridge-rsa-fingerprint. txt
Oh nice, thanks. I just saw that nusenu also thought of us 'proof:dns-rsa' users. ;-)
https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#dns-...
For bridges:
hashed-fingerprint.example.com value: “we-run-this-tor-bridge”
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

lists@for-privacy.net:
Oh nice, thanks. I just saw that nusenu also thought of us 'proof:dns-rsa' users. ;-)
https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/#dns-...
For bridges:
hashed-fingerprint.example.com value: “we-run-this-tor-bridge”
thanks for properly setting up the proofs for your 40 bridges :) -- https://nusenu.github.io
participants (3)
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Jonas Friedli
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lists@for-privacy.net
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nusenu