Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. NOWoT participation is optional, it is of course infiltratable, and what it proves may be arguable, but it seems a necessary thing to try as a test of that and to develop a good model. Many operators know each other in person. And the node density per geographic region supports getting out to meet operators even if only for the sole purpose of attesting 'I met this blob of flesh who proved ownership of node[s] x'. That's a big start, even against the sybil agents they'd surely send out to meet you. Many know exactly who the other is in the active community such that they can attest at that level. And so on down the line of different classes of trust that may be developed and asserted over each claimed operator. Assuming a NOWoT that actually says something can be established, is traffic then routable by the user over nodes via trust metrics in addition to the usual metrics and randomness? WoT's are an ancient subject... now what are the possibilities and issues when asserting them over physical nodes, not just over virtual nodes such as an email address found in your pubkey? And what about identities that exist only anonymously yet can prove control over various unique resources? If such WoT's cannot be proven to have non-value, then it seems worth doing.
This doesn't just apply to Tor, but to any node based system.
How does one establish trust online though? Trust is a very delicate thing. A system such as this simply inherently has these challenges. Pretty sure that is why the tor browser for example always uses https.
Op 21:26 vr 7 nov. 2014 schreef grarpamp grarpamp@gmail.com:
Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. NOWoT participation is optional, it is of course infiltratable, and what it proves may be arguable, but it seems a necessary thing to try as a test of that and to develop a good model. Many operators know each other in person. And the node density per geographic region supports getting out to meet operators even if only for the sole purpose of attesting 'I met this blob of flesh who proved ownership of node[s] x'. That's a big start, even against the sybil agents they'd surely send out to meet you. Many know exactly who the other is in the active community such that they can attest at that level. And so on down the line of different classes of trust that may be developed and asserted over each claimed operator. Assuming a NOWoT that actually says something can be established, is traffic then routable by the user over nodes via trust metrics in addition to the usual metrics and randomness? WoT's are an ancient subject... now what are the possibilities and issues when asserting them over physical nodes, not just over virtual nodes such as an email address found in your pubkey? And what about identities that exist only anonymously yet can prove control over various unique resources? If such WoT's cannot be proven to have non-value, then it seems worth doing.
This doesn't just apply to Tor, but to any node based system. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
How does one establish trust online though? Trust is a very delicate thing. A system such as this simply inherently has these challenges. Pretty sure that is why the tor browser for example always uses https.
Indeed, both the centralised and decentralised systems that are currently in place have major issues. Within centralised systems like the Certificate Authority system we see corruption (have you seen their fees) and we must trust them to actually verify identities and to remain secure, something at least a few CAs have proven that they can't do. Then we also have to trust our vendors to provide default lists of CAs to trust that are in fact worth of our trust.
Within decentralised systems like PGP we have to worry about the network effect, and making sure that people understand what they are actually doing, again we worry about whether or not we can trust our friends, and whether or not we can trust their friends.
Trust is probably one of the hardest problems facing folks using the Internet.
With that in mind, he does raise a valid point. Are there any plans to move to a more decentralised model for the directory authorities? Are their any plans to move the power to blacklist nodes out of the hands of the Tor Project and into the hands of its users somehow.
I'm not exactly sure how either of those would be accomplished, but I'm sure there is a clever solution somewhere.
Thank you, Derric Atzrott
With that in mind, he does raise a valid point. Are there any plans to
move
to a more decentralised model for the directory authorities? Are their any plans to move the power to blacklist nodes out of the hands of the Tor
Project
and into the hands of its users somehow.
This is pretty interesting point, but then i'm personally not really interested in having any control over the actual blacklist. I'd feel plenty comfortable with just insight into what is blacklisted, for what reason and if possible some evidence to support this reason. Giving control to "the people" isn't always a good thing either as even in TOR circles there'd be people that can't deal with having power on any level. Transparency is probably the word I was looking for to use. I didn't fill in contact information on my fresh tor relay simply because the app I use doesn't allow me to. (my tor relay runs on an Ouya, therefore android) Regardless of the absence of contact information the reason I run the relay are in line with the reasons why TOR exists.
2014-11-07 22:35 GMT+01:00 Derric Atzrott datzrott@alizeepathology.com:
How does one establish trust online though? Trust is a very delicate
thing. A
system such as this simply inherently has these challenges. Pretty sure
that
is why the tor browser for example always uses https.
Indeed, both the centralised and decentralised systems that are currently in place have major issues. Within centralised systems like the Certificate Authority system we see corruption (have you seen their fees) and we must trust them to actually verify identities and to remain secure, something at least a few CAs have proven that they can't do. Then we also have to trust our vendors to provide default lists of CAs to trust that are in fact worth of our trust.
Within decentralised systems like PGP we have to worry about the network effect, and making sure that people understand what they are actually doing, again we worry about whether or not we can trust our friends, and whether or not we can trust their friends.
Trust is probably one of the hardest problems facing folks using the Internet.
With that in mind, he does raise a valid point. Are there any plans to move to a more decentralised model for the directory authorities? Are their any plans to move the power to blacklist nodes out of the hands of the Tor Project and into the hands of its users somehow.
I'm not exactly sure how either of those would be accomplished, but I'm sure there is a clever solution somewhere.
Thank you, Derric Atzrott
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On 2014-11-07 16:08, Kevin de Bie wrote:
With that in mind, he does raise a valid point. Are there any plans to move to a more decentralised model for the directory authorities? Are their any plans to move the power to blacklist nodes out of the hands of the Tor Project and into the hands of its users somehow.
This is pretty interesting point, but then i'm personally not really interested in having any control over the actual blacklist. I'd feel plenty comfortable with just insight into what is blacklisted, for what reason and if possible some evidence to support this reason. Giving control to "the people" isn't always a good thing either as even in TOR circles there'd be people that can't deal with having power on any level. Transparency is probably the word I was looking for to use. I didn't fill in contact information on my fresh tor relay simply because the app I use doesn't allow me to. (my tor relay runs on an Ouya, therefore android) Regardless of the absence of contact information the reason I run the relay are in line with the reasons why TOR exists.
2014-11-07 22:35 GMT+01:00 Derric Atzrott datzrott@alizeepathology.com:
How does one establish trust online though? Trust is a very delicate thing. A system such as this simply inherently has these challenges. Pretty sure that is why the tor browser for example always uses https.
Indeed, both the centralised and decentralised systems that are currently in place have major issues. Within centralised systems like the Certificate Authority system we see corruption (have you seen their fees) and we must trust them to actually verify identities and to remain secure, something at least a few CAs have proven that they can't do. Then we also have to trust our vendors to provide default lists of CAs to trust that are in fact worth of our trust.
Within decentralised systems like PGP we have to worry about the network effect, and making sure that people understand what they are actually doing, again we worry about whether or not we can trust our friends, and whether or not we can trust their friends.
Trust is probably one of the hardest problems facing folks using the Internet.
With that in mind, he does raise a valid point. Are there any plans to move to a more decentralised model for the directory authorities? Are their any plans to move the power to blacklist nodes out of the hands of the Tor Project and into the hands of its users somehow.
I'm not exactly sure how either of those would be accomplished, but I'm sure there is a clever solution somewhere.
Thank you, Derric Atzrott
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [1]
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [1]
Trust can also be purchased indirectly. The operator you began trusting could hand over the keys for a price.
Links: ------ [1] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
I run a pseudonymous exit node and I'm not interested in giving up my pseudonymity by meeting people in real life.
I don't want to end up on a special interest watch list.
On Fri, Nov 07, 2014 at 03:26:40PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. NOWoT participation is optional, it is of course infiltratable, and what it proves may be arguable, but it seems a necessary thing to try as a test of that and to develop a good model. Many operators know each other in person. And the node density per geographic region supports getting out to meet operators even if only for the sole purpose of attesting 'I met this blob of flesh who proved ownership of node[s] x'. That's a big start, even against the sybil agents they'd surely send out to meet you. Many know exactly who the other is in the active community such that they can attest at that level. And so on down the line of different classes of trust that may be developed and asserted over each claimed operator. Assuming a NOWoT that actually says something can be established, is traffic then routable by the user over nodes via trust metrics in addition to the usual metrics and randomness? WoT's are an ancient subject... now what are the possibilities and issues when asserting them over physical nodes, not just over virtual nodes such as an email address found in your pubkey? And what about identities that exist only anonymously yet can prove control over various unique resources? If such WoT's cannot be proven to have non-value, then it seems worth doing.
This doesn't just apply to Tor, but to any node based system. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 8:26 PM, grarpamp grarpamp@gmail.com wrote:
Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem.
I had an idea for this a little while ago; https://tortbv.link/ using the published GPG signature in the contact info to sign the node fingerprint, if you trust the GPG key then you can _possibly_ trust that the node is run by the named operator.
Never got round to actually doing anything with it though...
On Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 5:58 AM, Gareth Llewellyn gareth@networksaremadeofstring.co.uk wrote:
I had an idea for this a little while ago; https://tortbv.link/ using the published GPG signature in the contact info to sign the node fingerprint, if you trust the GPG key then you can _possibly_ trust that the node is run by the named operator.
As an operator you would either - sign with your key a statement of node fingerprint into a notary service - create a subkey of your key holding said statement in comment - sign your key by node key if security of node key was better https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9478 But since the trust desired is from the [real]world down into and over the nodes, this one isn't really useful.
You then still have to use your key to form [real]world WOT among operators. Tying nodes to some [nym] identities is the first part... in a way, making sybil harder.
Then users opting to route paths through tor via trust metrics need to configure their client with whichever various trusted wot/root keys they like or subscribe to, which then uses them to score fingerprints for pathing. Doing this with them is second part.
Degree of freedom from some crossing of trusted key people is probably sufficient to score things.
Such a list could be pretty cool.
I'm interested but, we must agree on that, it probably shouldn't be used for adding privilege to people in this list. I mean, the "privilege" shouldn't empower them against Tor security, because in such a case, social engineering could create a vulnerability against the network.
Of course, every system needs sincerity, and trust, of at least few people (administrators at least). But what I'm thinking of is, for example private torrent trackers, or satellite TV cards hacking forums. If one successfully got an invitation code, an evil attacker (looking to catch illegal downloaders or I don't know what) will finish by having an invitation code too.
At the end, I'm aware that when using Tor, my TCP/IP sessions can be seen by exit relay operators and ISPs agents. Even governments and judicature can ask an ISP for recording a targeted user's Internet connexion. Even if the connection is https, the website to which I'm connected can see what I'm doing. At the end, I'm thinking that, if my data through Tor is more likely to use server in the "green list", my behavior will remain the same : Tor is just hiding the originating IP address and it gives me a way to access the Internet from any country without moving out of my home.
Being a Tor Relay operator, running several Tor exits, and having been questioned by police several times, I also know that it's better for me to provide without wearing any mask (if not, it could be easy to think that there is something strange with me). And if my computers got seized they will have to prove I'm clear as drinkable water. Even if me data goes through a "green Tor list", I will not change my behavior on this point ;)
----- Mail original ----- De: "grarpamp" grarpamp@gmail.com À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Cc: cypherpunks@cpunks.org Envoyé: Vendredi 7 Novembre 2014 21:26:40 Objet: [tor-relays] Node Operators Web Of Trust
Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust? Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info, do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends? Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day stocking grocery store, or in some building with a badge on it? Does their story jive? Are they active in the community/spaces we are? Etc. This is huge potential problem. NOWoT participation is optional, it is of course infiltratable, and what it proves may be arguable, but it seems a necessary thing to try as a test of that and to develop a good model. Many operators know each other in person. And the node density per geographic region supports getting out to meet operators even if only for the sole purpose of attesting 'I met this blob of flesh who proved ownership of node[s] x'. That's a big start, even against the sybil agents they'd surely send out to meet you. Many know exactly who the other is in the active community such that they can attest at that level. And so on down the line of different classes of trust that may be developed and asserted over each claimed operator. Assuming a NOWoT that actually says something can be established, is traffic then routable by the user over nodes via trust metrics in addition to the usual metrics and randomness? WoT's are an ancient subject... now what are the possibilities and issues when asserting them over physical nodes, not just over virtual nodes such as an email address found in your pubkey? And what about identities that exist only anonymously yet can prove control over various unique resources? If such WoT's cannot be proven to have non-value, then it seems worth doing.
This doesn't just apply to Tor, but to any node based system. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 8:36 AM, Julien ROBIN julien.robin28@free.fr wrote:
I'm interested but, we must agree on that, it probably shouldn't be used for adding privilege to people in this list.
It's up to the user to use or trust any assertions and/or the wot, there is not force there. Though yes, I'd never blacklist nodes in the directories just for nodes not being part of the wot.
If one successfully got an invitation code, an evil attacker
The user is evaluating and doing the inviting as they see fit.
For example, I might be inclined to route my traffic only over nodes run by those posting to this list, as opposed to also over the thousands of nodes that are nothing to me but an IP address.
The closest analogy is subscribing to adblocker subscriptions. If they subscribe to one that blocks torproject.org, that's their problem.
On Mon, 10 Nov 2014 08:45:59 -0500 Spencer Rhodes spencer@rhodespa.com: Strikes me as a very good idea. Perhaps lawyers wielding attorney-client privilege could be used to protect the identities of those node operators who wish to remain anonymous. -- Spencer Rhodes, Esq. 126 East Jefferson Street, Orlando, Florida USA 32801-1830 t: +1.321.332.0407 | f: +1.321.332.0409 | m: +1.407.796.8282
To the extent it would look and run like any 'private' LLC/trust, yes. Though various anons might not want to rely on paperwork and other people to maintain certain levels of anonymity. Depends on their threat model. What are the oppurunities and tradeoffs there as you see them?
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
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Derric Atzrott -
Gareth Llewellyn -
grarpamp -
Julien ROBIN -
Kevin de Bie -
obx -
Vladimir Ivanov