Re: [tor-relays] Heartbleed" Exchange of keys now or later?
After updating the OpenSSL, I chopped our relay's keys at noon EST yesterday. The traffic has indeed collapsed since then. Old configuration was averaging around 55Mb/s per my Cacti. A URL here: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/566B0F92197A9D855846E68D2AEEF8266B147D... This morning my Cacti graphs say it is still sitting at near nothing, like 1.5Mb. "arm" says between 500-600Kb/s. The new URL is here and at least at this time, you can really see the dropoff in the 3-day graph. https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/30C19B81981F450C402306E2E7CFB6C3F79CB6... I wonder how long it will take our relays to recover? I wonder if it is a good idea, or technically feasible, to do a one time kick-over of something in the Tor network so that the system sees what the relay flags etc. should be on these emergency-redefined relays. Certainly if everyone updated at once and the traffic died like this everywhere, Tor would be pretty messed.
Hi, I recall that Roger Dingledine pointed out that this is a stress situation for the whole network, but the flags should be in order in just a few days time. Better to update OpenSSL right now, discard everything in /keys and wait for the recovery. I expect that the vast majority of the systems should be back to business as usual in about 2-3 days. After updating the OpenSSL, I chopped our relay's keys at noon EST yesterday. The traffic has indeed collapsed since then. Old configuration was averaging around 55Mb/s per my Cacti. A URL here: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/566B0F92197A9D855846E68D2AEEF8266B147D... This morning my Cacti graphs say it is still sitting at near nothing, like 1.5Mb. "arm" says between 500-600Kb/s. The new URL is here and at least at this time, you can really see the dropoff in the 3-day graph. https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/30C19B81981F450C402306E2E7CFB6C3F79CB6... I wonder how long it will take our relays to recover? I wonder if it is a good idea, or technically feasible, to do a one time kick-over of something in the Tor network so that the system sees what the relay flags etc. should be on these emergency-redefined relays. Certainly if everyone updated at once and the traffic died like this everywhere, Tor would be pretty messed. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
I've also noticed a big uptick in traffic in the last 24/48 hours which has somewhat overwhelmed my poor Raspberry Pi :( guess we sit tight and wait for things to settle. On 9 Apr 2014 15:27, "Sebastian Urbach" <sebastian@urbach.org> wrote:
Hi,
I recall that Roger Dingledine pointed out that this is a stress situation for the whole network, but the flags should be in order in just a few days time.
Better to update OpenSSL right now, discard everything in /keys and wait for the recovery. I expect that the vast majority of the systems should be back to business as usual in about 2-3 days.
After updating the OpenSSL, I chopped our relay's keys at noon EST yesterday. The traffic has indeed collapsed since then. Old configuration was averaging around 55Mb/s per my Cacti. A URL here:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/566B0F92197A9D855846E68D2AEEF8 266B147D35
This morning my Cacti graphs say it is still sitting at near nothing, like 1.5Mb. "arm" says between 500-600Kb/s. The new URL is here and at least at this time, you can really see the dropoff in the 3-day graph.
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/30C19B81981F450C402306E2E7CFB6 C3F79CB6B2
I wonder how long it will take our relays to recover?
I wonder if it is a good idea, or technically feasible, to do a one time kick-over of something in the Tor network so that the system sees what the relay flags etc. should be on these emergency-redefined relays. Certainly if everyone updated at once and the traffic died like this everywhere, Tor would be pretty messed.
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
participants (3)
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Chris Whittleston -
Sebastian Urbach -
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