Re: [tor-relays] is a good idea to run a ssh honeypot?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 I use ufw as my firewall and it's set to limit ssh so if there's someone brute forcing the ssh it will get blocked for a time Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Sunday, April 7, 2019 7:54 PM, Elmar Otter <mailer@elmarotter.eu> wrote:
Hello,
Why don't you use Fail2Ban?
Greatings, Elmar
Op 07-04-19 om 21:52 schreef caioau:
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Hi, I been running a relay for almost 1,5 year, and in the beginning I didn't change the default 22 ssh port but a lot of people were trying to login , no worries I only allow public key authentication.
So I was wondering if I could record the attacks, so I find this https://haas.nic.cz/ service and I'm running on my relay, is it a good idea?
Thanks
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caioau