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Given the numbers of https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/index.php there are about 40 Tor exits which covers 1/3 of the whole bandwidth of all exit relays. I do wonder if under-weighting the big relays in favour of many smaller relays would make it harder for an adversary to de-anonymize the traffic ?
Bandwidth (KB/s) percent cumulated IP Address Hostname 0.00% 37188 1.52% 1.52% 197.231.221.211 exit1.ipredator.se 33608 1.38% 2.90% 94.242.246.24 orion.enn.lu 30720 1.26% 4.16% 77.247.181.166 77.247.181.166 30720 1.26% 5.42% 77.247.181.164 rainbowwarrior.torservers.net 30294 1.24% 6.66% 94.242.246.23 destiny.enn.lu 28732 1.18% 7.84% 176.126.252.11 chulak.enn.lu 28721 1.18% 9.02% 185.65.135.227 torproxy02.31173.se 26364 1.08% 10.10% 85.248.227.164 tollana.enn.lu 25927 1.06% 11.16% 176.126.252.12 aurora.enn.lu 22973 0.94% 12.10% 89.234.157.254 marylou.nos-oignons.net 22579 0.93% 13.03% 85.248.227.163 ori.enn.lu 22551 0.92% 13.95% 192.42.116.16 tor-exit.hartvoorinternetvrijheid.nl 21765 0.89% 14.84% 5.79.68.161 Relay-J.tor-exit.network 21280 0.87% 15.72% 93.115.95.204 lh28409.voxility.net 20768 0.85% 16.57% 5.79.68.161 Relay-J.tor-exit.network 20413 0.84% 17.40% 176.61.147.146 176.61.147.146 19993 0.82% 18.22% 65.19.167.130 65.19.167.130 19966 0.82% 19.04% 207.244.70.35 207.244.70.35 19689 0.81% 19.85% 195.154.56.44 tor-exit.gansta93.com 19685 0.81% 20.66% 46.166.170.6 tor-exit-2.netdive.xyz 19662 0.81% 21.46% 171.25.193.132 tor-exit6-readme.dfri.se 19253 0.79% 22.25% 77.247.181.165 politkovskaja.torservers.net 18905 0.77% 23.03% 89.234.157.254 marylou.nos-oignons.net 18319 0.75% 23.78% 93.115.95.206 lh28409.voxility.net 18066 0.74% 24.52% 142.4.213.25 heaven.tor.ninja 18033 0.74% 25.26% 62.210.129.246 relay1.tor.openinternet.io 17932 0.73% 25.99% 188.138.9.49 atlantic480.us.unmetered.com 17904 0.73% 26.72% 65.19.167.132 65.19.167.132 17695 0.73% 27.45% 109.163.234.5 hessel3.torservers.net 17507 0.72% 28.17% 46.165.230.5 tor-exit.dhalgren.org 17171 0.70% 28.87% 194.150.168.95 kaputte.li 16262 0.67% 29.54% 79.172.193.32 toreador.webenlet.hu 14726 0.60% 30.14% 109.163.234.2 hessel0.torservers.net 14637 0.60% 30.74% 85.214.98.239 h2343030.stratoserver.net 14181 0.58% 31.32% 171.25.193.78 tor-exit4-readme.dfri.se 14164 0.58% 31.90% 193.171.202.146 tor2e.ins.tor.net.eu.org 14022 0.57% 32.48% 188.214.129.85 hst-188-214-129-85.balticservers.eu 13987 0.57% 33.05% 171.25.193.131 tor-exit7-readme.dfri.se 13962 0.57% 33.62% 193.90.12.86 tor-1.multisec.no
- -- Toralf PGP: C4EACDDE 0076E94E, OTR: 420E74C8 30246EE7
Toralf Förster:
Given the numbers of https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/index.php there are about 40 Tor exits which covers 1/3 of the whole bandwidth of all exit relays. I do wonder if under-weighting the big relays in favour of many smaller relays would make it harder for an adversary to de-anonymize the traffic ?
A more diverse tor network (more relays, in more locations, and a more balanced cw-fraction across relays) would probably make it harder for an adversary which can only observe a few spots on the internet to watch most of the tor traffic. Manipulating CW values makes it certainly possible to distribute traffic more evenly but that comes with a performance impact. How bad is it really and how much are you willing to "pay" (in latency+bw) to make it how much better?
In the end its usually performance vs. anonymity properties. Bad performance results in fewer users, and smaller anonymity sets imply weaker anonymity properties.
Unfortunately there are no incentives for geo or AS diversity or even limits like "any given hoster/AS/country/operator.. is not allowed to host more than ___% of the tor network".
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
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nusenu -
Toralf Förster