Clients don't choose relays in the same /16 in the same circuit. So I don't think this is a danger to users.

Ok.

We would like to write a polite email saying: "thanks for helping Tor, please add a family to your config".

But since they haven't provided contact details, we can't do that.

T

-- Tim / teor

PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n

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But as Aneesh pointed out in the other thread:

---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- Subject: Re: [tor-relays] DoS attacks on multiple relays From: "Aneesh Dogra" lionaneesh@gmail.com Date: Tue, December 5, 2017 9:37 am To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org

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Looks scary. Interesting to see they all have high guard probabilities. :-?

My concerns are more about the HS harvesting/correlation capabilities these relays have, than de-anonymisation of users.

I am not a Tor specialist, but would like to know if there are any kind of safety measures against such persons/entities employing automated big farms, high speed, stable guards, HSDir, without family set, or proposals being discussed on the topic.

cheers.

x9p