Perhaps a way to do it is reset the consensus for a relay if its IP address moves to a different Autonomous System.
Is rare that dynamic IP causes relays to hop ASs (e.g. possibly SBC/ATT), and list of exceptions could be created for the few cases where it causes trouble.
CYMRU has a dynamic service for looking up AS from IP.
On 27 Jul 2015, at 01:30 , starlight.2015q2@binnacle.cx wrote:
Perhaps a way to do it is reset the consensus for a relay if its IP address moves to a different Autonomous System.
Is rare that dynamic IP causes relays to hop ASs (e.g. possibly SBC/ATT), and list of exceptions could be created for the few cases where it causes trouble.
CYMRU has a dynamic service for looking up AS from IP.
What if an entire IP block (or entire AS) moves ASs?
What if the external dependency on CYMRU allows the entire Tor Network to be "reset" if CYMRU is hacked/broken/incorrect?
Tim
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5
teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7
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teor:
On 27 Jul 2015, at 01:30 , starlight.2015q2@binnacle.cx wrote:
Perhaps a way to do it is reset the consensus for a relay if its IP address moves to a different Autonomous System.
Is rare that dynamic IP causes relays to hop ASs (e.g. possibly SBC/ATT), and list of exceptions could be created for the few cases where it causes trouble.
CYMRU has a dynamic service for looking up AS from IP.
What if an entire IP block (or entire AS) moves ASs?
What if the external dependency on CYMRU allows the entire Tor Network to be "reset" if CYMRU is hacked/broken/incorrect?
That will all not work, IPs are nothing which you can rely on and reset consens if it does change. My home IP jump between to ASs every day on reconnect. My ISP own both AS and with the IPv4 shortage that will get even more crazy the next few years. I'm cleary against reset consens, ban FP or what ever you guys think would be right.
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org