In this instance, it was local authorities, and the guy bought all-new hardware, so I'd say this specific problem is solved.
For future reference, how would we even find these incidents? This time it was on the news, but if it wasn't, nobody would have known. On Apr 8, 2016 12:54 PM, "Green Dream" greendream848@gmail.com wrote:
Who said Tor was against the police?
The fact is, in the United States, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been known to plant malware, modify hardware, etc., in order to maintain persistent access to machines they wish to monitor. Whether or not you think this is valid in some cases or all cases is really beside the point. The question is whether exit node hardware can be trusted after a search warrant is served and the police are given full and unmonitored access to said hardware. As a matter of due diligence, I'd argue the hardware and OS can no longer be trusted in such cases.
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Tristan wrote on 08/04/2016 19:57:
In this instance, it was local authorities, and the guy bought all-new hardware, so I'd say this specific problem is solved.
For future reference, how would we even find these incidents? This time it was on the news, but if it wasn't, nobody would have known.
Besides, as I said, the FBI, just like any ISIS affiliate, can put up all the exit nodes it likes, so it would be a waste of time for them to bug other exits. A blacklist of these supposedly bugged exits would be ridiculously useless for its incompleteness. It wouldn't do any harm either, so go ahead, but that's certainly not something Tor's security should rely upon.
Marco
Besides, as I said, the FBI, just like any ISIS affiliate, can put up all the exit nodes it likes, so it would be a waste of time for them to bug other exits. A blacklist of these supposedly bugged exits would be ridiculously useless for its incompleteness. It wouldn't do any harm either, so go ahead, but that's certainly not something Tor's security should rely upon.
I personally I agree with you Marco.
However, some people's interest in Tor is less about security or anonymity, but chiefly as an avenue by which they can establish alternatives to as well as challenge various established power-structures. Cohabitating with representatives of said power-structures, even when it doesn't actually affect the security model, makes them uneasy. Although groups within the Tor community may have slightly different long-term goals, it is in our collective interest to get along.
-V
On Sun, Apr 10, 2016 at 12:02 AM, Marco Predicatori marco@predicatori.it wrote:
Tristan wrote on 08/04/2016 19:57:
In this instance, it was local authorities, and the guy bought all-new hardware, so I'd say this specific problem is solved.
For future reference, how would we even find these incidents? This time it was on the news, but if it wasn't, nobody would have known.
Besides, as I said, the FBI, just like any ISIS affiliate, can put up all the exit nodes it likes, so it would be a waste of time for them to bug other exits. A blacklist of these supposedly bugged exits would be ridiculously useless for its incompleteness. It wouldn't do any harm either, so go ahead, but that's certainly not something Tor's security should rely upon.
Marco
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