I bumped out some more bad relays
Hi folks, I spent some time this week refining a new exit scanner, and today we pushed some new reject rules to kick out some relays that we confirmed were running mitmproxy to do more sslstrips. For past context, see these urls: https://blog.torproject.org/bad-exit-relays-may-june-2020 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-July/018656.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html Expect some upcoming next steps that aim to change the fundamental arms race, including experiments to use https by default in Tor Browser, either via HTTPS Everywhere's "Encrypt All Sites Eligible" option (you can turn that on right now) or via Firefox's upcoming built-in version of the idea: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/19850 For completeness, I'm including below the set of fingerprints that we bumped out. Note that we didn't confirm misbehavior from all of them -- some of them we're bumping out because they seemed sufficiently similar to the confirmed ones. If any of these are your relays, please speak up! Thanks, --Roger Group #1: COMID (coronamitmdisease2019) at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roup #2: info@cypherpunklabs.com at OVH 023455597DAB689EE84FB3A7BC7FC5F9A3E27FD6 044E647F34EDA4AC975EDAD628C4E9BCFFF1FB08 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Hi all On Fri, 2020-10-30 at 23:05 -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Good. Does this mean it will be check and bumped more regularly? I see that lots of relays are running for more than one month from now.
Yes. From the browser perspective, HTTPS should be enforced whatever the context. We may blame final Tor users or website administors for not following security guidance (eg. HSTS preload) but in the end it is the Tor user privacy that is compromised. This is lasting for months and could have been easily prevented. This game of cat and mouse is not good for Tor reputation. Thanks -- Croax
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 09:37:38AM +0100, Croax wrote:
I hope so. I plan to keep running my new scripts and see where things go. Part of it depends on the next steps of the jerk who is doing this. Or said from the other side: if you find a misbehaving relay, or if you find that a particular url seems like it's being intercepted even if you can't figure out which relay is doing it, please report it! The sad version of the story is that there's a "long tail" of possible sites that they could mess with, and if they only mess with unpopular or uncommon, it might be a while until anybody notices. But the happy version of the story is that the more we and others check, the farther down the long tail we push them, i.e. the lower profile they need to be to remain unnoticed. And pushing them down the long tail is also hopefully pushing them towards the point where their operations are unprofitable. I am definitely missing the in-person gatherings around the world here. It used to be that we could say "Oh, you're in country X? Why don't you meet with so-and-so who is nearby to you" and then build human trust relationships. This year nobody meets anybody, and it is having surprising second-order effects like limiting the growth of the global internet freedom community.
I completely agree. You're seeing the intersection of two core areas of Tor -- "Tor Browser" and "network health" -- that were both impacted more than average by our covid budget cuts. We definitely have gotten the attention of the Tor Browser devs now, and these steps are on their roadmaps, so I'm optimistic that we'll have some not-just-cat-and-mouse improvements in the medium term. --Roger
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 09:46:38AM +0100, Toralf Förster wrote:
So these got the flag "Unmeasured" but not "BadExit", right ?
We "rejected" their fingerprints, rather than badexiting the fingerprints. So nobody will be using them for anything -- not exiting, not anything else. The "Unmeasured" flag that you're seeing on relay-search means that for that vote, that relay didn't have the required threshold of three votes from directory authorities that run bandwidth authorities. "Unmeasured" here isn't a flag that we explicitly changed, so much as a byproduct of doing the blocking: as directory authorities added their "reject" rules over the course of some hours, the ones that did the reject first happened to be ones that ran bandwidth authorities, so there was a period of a few hours where the relays had enough votes to still get listed as Running, but not enough of the votes came with opinions about bandwidth weights. And because relay-search shows you the last known thing about the relay (i.e. from when it was last listed in a consensus), their relay-search status is frozen in time at that moment before they disappeared entirely. Hope that explains the weird behavior. :) --Roger
Hi Andrey, Roger Dingledine:
after confirming with the hoster that you were and are in fact their customer at these and other IPs used by malicious tor relays, I was wondering whether you wanted to comment on that? Especially since you recently added more exit relays. kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io
nusenu:
FWIW: we kicked a bunch of relays out of the network today which might or might not contain any of those, hard to tell. (In addition to other relays, too, which might or might not be related to those). Thanks for staying vigilant, everyone. Much appreciated and needed. Georg
kind regards, nusenu
FWIW: we kicked a bunch of relays out of the network today which might or might not contain any of those, hard to tell.
Please publish the relay fingerprints that directory authorities remove, otherwise only the malicious entities get to learn and improve since they see the removal in their logfiles anyway but we tor users don't get to learn anything because it remains largely invisible to us. Roger's email from 2020-10-31 is a good example that made further investigations possible. kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io
nusenu:
That's a bit tricky because potential *other* attackers might be able to learn things from our rejects if we are not careful. On the other hand, transparency is very valuable, in particular in the bad-relays area which is one of the least transparent areas in Tor (for good reasons, though, see Roger's mail[1] from a couple of years back explaining the dilemma we are in). That said I think we could try publishing, with some delay, the fingerprints we reject after seeing them involved in attacks. For instance, we could have a monthly list of those fingerprints which we publish, as a general rule of thumb[2], at the beginning of the following month. I think I'll find a place in our network-health wiki for that. Thanks for the suggestion, Georg [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-July/034219.html [2] There might be exceptions to that rule, though, for instance if an attack starts at the end of the month and is still on-going during the begin of the new one, or if we think the rejection is too close to the end of that month and thus the delay I talked about above is too short. In both and other cases those fingerprints will then get picked up at the begin of the month following after that.
Georg Koppen:
Here we go. I added the list of fingerprints for April 2021. I plan to keep adding fingerprints monthly on the same wiki page[3], as we find them in attacks. Georg
[3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-finge...
Georg Koppen:
suggestion for an improvement to this process so it will become more accurate/complete (example: May 2021 is incomplete) and continue to work even a few months or years later and is more automation/machine readable friendly than the current approach - perform rejections in monthly files (files are included in the dir auth config) YYYY-MM - have a monthly cronjob that copies and pushes the priors month file into a public git repository kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io
nusenu:
Could you elaborate on why you think May 2021 is incomplete and how to fix that?
Hrm, maybe. I am not sure. One thing that makes things complicated is that not all rejections are attacks in the sense we mentioned in the wiki, so we would suddenly need to track those cases in different files it seems.
- have a monthly cronjob that copies and pushes the priors month file into a public git repository
The wiki is essentially a public git repository. I am not sure what another public git repository would give us. Georg
kind regards, nusenu
Georg Koppen:
I believe DAs rejected >1000 relays, but instead of listing their fingerprints on the page, it links to my email which includes a truncated list and does not contain full fingerprints https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-May/019644.html
The wiki is essentially a public git repository. I am not sure what another public git repository would give us.
it would give users of these lists the possibility to consume it in a much more trivial way without having understand the semantics of the wiki page curl https://gitlab..../$lastmonth-rejection-file kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io
nusenu:
Right. I was for some reason under the assumption we could get away by just linking to your mail. But you are correct, we should do better here. So, I went over our May rejections again and updated the wiki page with the ones I think were missing.[1] Thanks!
Fair enough. I am not sure yet how we'll make those improvements, but I've filed a ticket[2] at least to not forget about it. My current plan is to tackle that task while re-doing our bad-relay related tooling, which is supposed to start Q1 2022. Georg [1] I included an additional fingerprint that I missed while I was at it, as our tooling for that part is obviously not great yet. [2] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/issues/157
participants (5)
-
Croax -
Georg Koppen -
nusenu -
Roger Dingledine -
Toralf Förster