new warn message: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Today I got this for the first since I run exits: Oct 06 08:23:03.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. Something I should worry about ? - -- Toralf PGP: C4EACDDE 0076E94E, OTR: 420E74C8 30246EE7 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlf2Dz0ACgkQxOrN3gB26U5LMAD+POAhOITGeYh5CFdOwFxgfzMf 510EN+mxt+3nTAFXgrIA/1BUXnr1DXh61y5ttIxSoVGJb95r8FTrnKiDTZ23yBkV =vFhm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

I had 3 today on my non-exit relay. Can't remember seeing them before. Maybe they are new in 0.2.8.8? Times are UTC+2 Oct 06 09:14:03.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. Oct 06 14:08:13.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. Oct 06 14:08:14.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. ------ Originalmeddelande ------ Från: "Toralf Förster" <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Till: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Skickat: 2016-10-06 10:45:49 Ämne: [tor-relays] new warn message: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 10/06/2016 06:29 PM, Logforme wrote:
Maybe they are new in 0.2.8.8? nope, from "git blame" the appropriate line is part of git commit 339df5df and that commit is already part of tor-0.2.4.11-alpha :
commit 339df5df085e2115c01881cf628abe5ed3fbd456 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Sun Mar 10 08:32:58 2013 -0400 Fix 8447: use %u to format circid_t. Now that circid_t is 4 bytes long, the default integer promotions will leave it alone when sizeof(int) == 4, which will leave us formatting an unsigned as an int. That's technically undefined behavior. Fixes bug 8447 on bfffc1f0fc7616a25c32da2eb759dade4651659e. Bug not in any released Tor. - -- Toralf PGP: C4EACDDE 0076E94E, OTR: 420E74C8 30246EE7 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlf3wQoACgkQxOrN3gB26U4o3AEAigGioHWzKg9sSbDYkRHMeieR 6k4LYT/cdFN7CueizmgA/iLp8uInP87xiRxdTsLjHXMxVNejRi+isC3r49U0XRZL =r+19 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Toralf Förster:
I'm unable find change to this line in 339df5df085e2115c01881cf628abe5ed3fbd456. AFAICT, this line was introduced long ago in 2004 by a981c4099af25e8e38ca1fbe4870d09c54d0d20b (SVN commit) and never touched since then. I think we should dig deeper why does this happen (started to happen?). Is it a bug in tor that produces such duplicate cookies or it's in some independent/modified implementation. -- Ivan Markin

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 10/07/2016 05:55 PM, Ivan Markin wrote:
I'm unable find change to this line in 339df5df085e2115c01881cf628abe5ed3fbd456.
Right, it is commit 259c65ab08a4a88e310097cd5df155d62ea22447 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 13 10:33:00 2006 +0000 the last of the log convention conversion. finally. svn:r6005 - -- Toralf PGP: C4EACDDE 0076E94E, OTR: 420E74C8 30246EE7 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlf3yxcACgkQxOrN3gB26U595QD/fY03evHs3qGlPhkx16dZOkV9 20WXeBgKoQsNXJzNnjoA/i13FBps1+5GMSjaGKjIJe1zTzN+u7aVcMz7nuk2xwpp =Jfey -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

One of my guard relays has a few entries on Oct 06 also: Oct 06 09:04:00.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. Oct 06 09:04:00.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. Oct 06 10:17:30.000 [warn] Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS. Times are in UTC. Logs on this machine go back to Oct 03 but those are the only occurrences. My other guard relay with nearly identical specs and CW doesn't have these entries.

I just checked the logs on my exit, the only warnings I have are the usual " 127.0.0.1:53 is down, All DNS servers are back up" messages. On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 2:00 PM, pa011 <pa011@web.de> wrote:
-- Finding information, passing it along. ~SuperSluether

pa011:
Several of those warnings here as well on Oct 06 - on exit as on non exit - at different times
Sure, type of relay doesn't matter here since a rendezvous client picks random relay to act as Rendezvous Point. Somehow there are clients who send more than one ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell to the same relay with the same cookie. Most likely it's behavior of some alternative/modified tor implementation (since it started recently and at almost the same time?). At least I can't find a way little-t-tor is able to do this. -- Ivan Markin

Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> writes:
Hello and thanks for reporting this issue! I opened a trac ticket about this, as that's a better way to handle little-t-tor bugs. Please feel free to contribute there: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20332 I took a brief look at the relevant code, and I'm also not sure what's causing the issue. More digging required.

George Kadianakis:
I took a brief look at the relevant code, and I'm also not sure what's causing the issue. More digging required.
Toralf Förster:
Something I should worry about ?
I think one should emphasize that relay operators shouldn't worry about it since it's client(s) [hopefully not little-t-tor one(s)] who send such cells. Thanks everybody reporting about this issue! -- Ivan Markin
participants (9)
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George Kadianakis
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Green Dream
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Ivan Markin
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Logforme
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Markus Koch
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pa011
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Petrusko
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Toralf Förster
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Tristan