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I do wonder how Tor handles the case that a malicious Tor relay provides the same onion address as another Tor relay ?
- -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E
Look at the Tor Rendezvous Specification rend-spec-v3.txt https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt, the onion addresses that a user enter are Self authenticating, Because the onion address is the public key of the hidden service. Roger explains this in the DEF CON talk here https://youtu.be/Di7qAVidy1Y?t=1124 https://youtu.be/Di7qAVidy1Y?t=1124
On Oct 14, 2017, at 12:33 AM, Toralf Förster toralf.foerster@gmx.de wrote:
do wonder how Tor handl
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On 10/14/2017 09:41 AM, Jacki M wrote:
Look at the Tor Rendezvous Specification rend-spec-v3.txt https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt, the onion addresses that a user enter are Self authenticating, Because the onion address is the public key of the hidden service. Roger explains this in the DEF CON talk here https://youtu.be/Di7qAVidy1Y?t=1124 Thx for the links.
My questions goes rather in the direction that by this a malicious Toir could catch all the traffic designed for the other Tor - even without encrypting it - and therefore dry-ing out that Tor.
- -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E
If the user enters a onion address inside their browser tor will guarantee that you’re visiting the correct website/onion and not allow any man in the middle attacks to occur, because of the self authentication.
Sent from my iPad
On Oct 14, 2017, at 12:47 AM, Toralf Förster toralf.foerster@gmx.de wrote:
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On 10/14/2017 09:41 AM, Jacki M wrote: Look at the Tor Rendezvous Specification rend-spec-v3.txt https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt, the onion addresses that a user enter are Self authenticating, Because the onion address is the public key of the hidden service. Roger explains this in the DEF CON talk here https://youtu.be/Di7qAVidy1Y?t=1124 Thx for the links.
My questions goes rather in the direction that by this a malicious Toir could catch all the traffic designed for the other Tor - even without encrypting it - and therefore dry-ing out that Tor.
Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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On 10/14/2017 09:58 AM, Jacki M wrote:
tor will guarantee that you’re visiting the correct website/onion and not allow any man in the middle attacks to occur,
Thx for clarification.
/me is reading the spec in the mean while
- -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
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Jacki M -
Toralf Förster