increasing per IP tor instance limit (2 instances per one IPv4)
Roman Mamedov:
Another idea that I proposed some time ago is raising the relay-per-IP limit
is there a trac ticket for this already? AFAIR that limit primarily exists mainly to increase the price for Sybil attacks, but since they would be trivially detected (i.e. by OrNetRadar), I do not see why increasing that limit would hurt (much) on the other side: Is there an actual demand for increasing that per IP limit? If you have been impacted by that '2 instances per public IPv4'-limit and would benefit from an increase please speak up -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_
On 10 Jul 2017, at 06:25, nusenu <nusenu-lists@riseup.net> wrote:
Roman Mamedov:
Another idea that I proposed some time ago is raising the relay-per-IP limit
is there a trac ticket for this already?
AFAIR that limit primarily exists mainly to increase the price for Sybil attacks, but since they would be trivially detected (i.e. by OrNetRadar), I do not see why increasing that limit would hurt (much)
Only trivial sybils can be trivially detected by automated processes. An attacker who gradually adds a server with a different config every week or two benefits from this change: every extra relay per IPv4 address boosts the benefit of this attack. T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even support for >1 per /24 is questionable when facing sybil, and it lets people be lazy piling on known hosters instead of shopping around for new tor / crypto friendly providers and supporting that by throwing money at them. If you want to 'get your money worth' then also run I2P, Freenet, CJDNS, Pond, Gnunet, Mixminion, etc etc nodes on your contract. Tor isn't everything.
participants (3)
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grarpamp -
nusenu -
teor