Hi everyone,
I've finally made a new GPG key (after a scant 7 years!).
This new key will be used to sign email from me going forward, and will be used to sign software releases until such time as I get around to creating a second set of keys on a hardware token for that purpose.
While I dislike the Web of Trust for a number of reasons*, my plan is to cross-certify these two sets of new keys, and also sign both with my old key. Hence I will not immediately be issuing a revocation for my old key.
The new key is attached, and is available on the keyservers (with a signature from my old key) at: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x29846B3C683686CC
Here's the fingerprint and current subkey information for reference: pub 8192R/29846B3C683686CC 2013-09-11 Key fingerprint = C963 C21D 6356 4E2B 10BB 335B 2984 6B3C 6836 86CC uid Mike Perry (Regular use key) mikeperry@torproject.org sub 4096R/717F1F130E3A92E4 2013-09-11 [expires: 2014-09-11] sub 4096R/A3BD8153BC40FFA0 2013-09-11 [expires: 2014-09-11]
This message should also be signed by my previous key, which was used extensively to sign my email and my source code releases prior to today.
* Ensuing flamewars about the Web of Trust should reply only to tor-talk.
Hi, Since TorProject.org domain-name is already DNSSEC signed, will you pls consider to include your and Runa's GPG key (which are used for signing Tor and related software) into DNS ? Then using even dig (or gpg tools) regular/other users (who uses local DNSSEC based DNS-Servers) can obtain DNSSEC authenticated super accurate GPG keys. No need to blindly always trust a middle-man gpg-key-sharing servers. Pls share it via multiple channels/mediums. Specially, developers who owns domain-names or works under a group which has domain-name, they, and who releases software, they should VERY seriously consider to include their signing related (full) GPG pub-keys in DNS for declaring and sharing your GPG-keys, just like declaring SSL/TLS certificate via "TLSA"/DANE, so users can get authentic full keys and/or certificates. Such should help in reducing various falsifications. Thanks in advance, - Bright Star. bry 8 st ar a.@t. in ven ta ti d.o.t. or g: GPG-FPR:C70FD3D070EB5CADFC040FCB80F68A461F5923FA. bry 8 st ar a.@t. ya hoo d.o.t. c om: GPG-FPR:12B77F2C92BF25C838C64D9C8836DBA2576C10EC.
Received from Mike Perry, on 2013-09-27 2:18 PM:
Hi everyone,
I've finally made a new GPG key (after a scant 7 years!).
This new key will be used to sign email from me going forward, and will be used to sign software releases until such time as I get around to creating a second set of keys on a hardware token for that purpose.
While I dislike the Web of Trust for a number of reasons*, my plan is to cross-certify these two sets of new keys, and also sign both with my old key. Hence I will not immediately be issuing a revocation for my old key.
The new key is attached, and is available on the keyservers (with a signature from my old key) at: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x29846B3C683686CC
Here's the fingerprint and current subkey information for reference: pub 8192R/29846B3C683686CC 2013-09-11 Key fingerprint = C963 C21D 6356 4E2B 10BB 335B 2984 6B3C 6836 86CC uid Mike Perry (Regular use key) mikeperry@torproject.org sub 4096R/717F1F130E3A92E4 2013-09-11 [expires: 2014-09-11] sub 4096R/A3BD8153BC40FFA0 2013-09-11 [expires: 2014-09-11]
This message should also be signed by my previous key, which was used extensively to sign my email and my source code releases prior to today.
- Ensuing flamewars about the Web of Trust should reply only to tor-talk.
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