Hello,
I put a bridge on an unused server. Currently listed on Tor-metrics. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/48022B9A9402CB6D9918C03B8AFD2...
But the IP per mail will soon have the "bad guy's". That would be too bad. With 2 Tor-instances, the server has reached 80-100 MiB/s Does the Tor-project have any other more secret bridge lists?
Another question: Is it useful to offer other transport protocols than obfs4?
On Sun, Dec 08, 2019 at 10:13:08PM +0100, lists@for-privacy.net wrote:
I put a bridge on an unused server. Currently listed on Tor-metrics. https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/48022B9A9402CB6D9918C03B8AFD2...
Thanks for running a bridge!
But the IP per mail will soon have the "bad guy's". That would be too bad. With 2 Tor-instances, the server has reached 80-100 MiB/s Does the Tor-project have any other more secret bridge lists?
There are two ways of distributing your bridge. You can do it automatically by having your bridge announce itself to BridgeDB, our bridge distribution system. That's the default behaviour. BridgeDB then distributes your bridge over email, HTTPS, and moat. Alternatively, you can distribute your bridge manually by using the config option "BridgeDistribution none" to tell BridgeDB that it shouldn't distribute your bridge. If you do this, it's your responsibility to find users and give them your bridge lines.
Is it useful to offer other transport protocols than obfs4?
Not at this point. We're not aware of any government or commercial firewall being able to block the obfs4 protocol.
On 09.12.2019 22:53, Philipp Winter wrote:
There are two ways of distributing your bridge. You can do it automatically by having your bridge announce itself to BridgeDB, our bridge distribution system. That's the default behaviour. BridgeDB then distributes your bridge over email, HTTPS, and moat.
Yes, I did that and why I'm asking here. Unfortunately, I fear that the Chinese government will only need a few hours or days to close these bridges. (Great Firewall of China) Or worse: they monitor the connections and arrest the users in China. :-(
Alternatively, you can distribute your bridge manually by using the config option "BridgeDistribution none" to tell BridgeDB that it shouldn't distribute your bridge. If you do this, it's your responsibility to find users and give them your bridge lines.
I was hoping to hear from private distribution lists here.
Then I have to look around among the Chinese students in my city. Fortunately, I live directly at the student dormitories and international guest house. I will then take new IP's for the private bridges.
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
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Philipp Winter