Hi Roger, That sounds good to me and from what i see there should be at least enough guard capacity to go through with it. Exit's are a whole other matter but honestly if those 12% still running around with the bleedingheart than kick 'em. Hi folks, I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday. I got the list from Sina's scanner: https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/ I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag rather than rejecting them outright, but this way they'll get notices in their logs. I also thought for a while about trying to keep my list of fingerprints up-to-date (i.e. removing the !reject line once they've upgraded their openssl), but on the other hand, if they were still vulnerable as of yesterday, I really don't want this identity key on the Tor network even after they've upgraded their openssl. If the other directory authority operators follow suit, we'll lose about 12% of the exit capacity and 12% of the guard capacity. I/we should add to this list as we discover other relays that come online with vulnerable openssl versions. Also these are just the relays with Guard and/or Exit flags, so we should add the other 1000+ at some point soon. --Roger