Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, Vol 12, Issue 9
From: tor-relays-request@lists.torproject.org Subject: tor-relays Digest, Vol 12, Issue 9 To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 12:00:02 +0000
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: consensus update request (grarpamp) 2. Re: not specified families (Aurel W.) 3. Re: not specified families (Tor Relays at brwyatt.net) 4. Re: not specified families (Damian Johnson) 5. New authority (Sebastian Urbach)
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Message: 1 Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 17:45:51 -0500 From: grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] consensus update request Message-ID: <CAD2Ti2-Ti1qv4Pb22JsKmpZXMTWPhSPwGyyLtkewYo5Z-U-rJA@mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Maybe this is why my client is taking so long to load at the moment. At first I thought it was my update to ossl 100f, but after checking 100e again, it's not. Tor currently sits in the netstatus consensus and missing dir auth phases for indefinite tens of minutes before coming online.
valid-until 2012-01-09 20:00:00 Mon Jan 9 22:..:.. UTC 2012
Is this something that's distributable as a piecemeal flood into the net as each router is validated. Some sort of client held table so the scale work and partitioning is done there with their cpu/disk.
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Message: 2 Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 00:28:16 +0100 From: "Aurel W." <aurel.w@gmail.com> To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] not specified families Message-ID: <CAAG-S2FCxKctVtpPj08Gpkyt5b6hvqO+T2EzauBfUMk=iZv59A@mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Malicious relays trying to de-anonimize people are not going to use MyFamily for obvious reasons, and also they will not choose an obvious nick sequence like MetallicaFan1, MetallicaFan2,etc So it seems to me this option has only theoretical benefit, but in practice it's naive. True, but in theory you also have to consider that nodes could get compromised and then it is very likely that a whole family is affected (may be too paranoid for some).
I also wonder if it gets harder to identify a real threat, of a malicious attacker operating many nodes, if there are so many other cases of not-specified families.
The "MetallicaFan1, MetallicaFan2,.." nodes might not be a problem, because no one with a malicious attempt would name nodes like that. But they are an indication, that there might be a bunch of other nodes, without any such strong sings, but which are also operated by one single individual. Because obviously, it's a very common mistake in configuration.
There might be feasible techniques to find suspicious groups of relays, but with all this non specified families, this would be rather pointless.
aurel
aurel
On 9 January 2012 23:39, Javier Bassi <javierbassi@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Jan 9, 2012 at 7:13 PM, Aurel W. <aurel.w@gmail.com> wrote:
Shouldn't this be treated more seriously? There are literally over 100 high bandwidth relays, which should specify a family but which don't. If you monitor a client, it is very frequently that circuits are built where two relays are clearly controlled by the same person.
As a first try I mailed to two contact email addresses, but I haven't got any response.
In the end its the same. Relay operators who are willing to place MyFamily in their torrc file are not the ones that are going to try to identify you. Malicious relays trying to de-anonimize people are not going to use MyFamily for obvious reasons, and also they will not choose an obvious nick sequence like MetallicaFan1, MetallicaFan2,etc So it seems to me this option has only theoretical benefit, but in practice it's naive. Or maybe I'm missing something _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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Message: 3 Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 01:21:20 +0000 From: "Tor Relays at brwyatt.net" <tor@brwyatt.net> To: <tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] not specified families Message-ID: <802693728989435@jngomktg.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Wouldn't it be possible to code the Tor clients to not build circuits using relays in the same /24 or with "similar" names? While that wouldn't fix ALL possible attack scenarios, that could certainly help, and help against accidental (or malicious) misconfigured nodes.
On Tue, 10 Jan 2012 00:28:16 +0100, "Aurel W." <aurel.w@gmail.com> wrote:
Malicious relays trying to de-anonimize people are not going to use MyFamily for obvious reasons, and also they will not choose an obvious nick sequence like MetallicaFan1, MetallicaFan2,etc So it seems to me this option has only theoretical benefit, but in practice it's naive. True, but in theory you also have to consider that nodes could get compromised and then it is very likely that a whole family is affected (may be too paranoid for some).
I also wonder if it gets harder to identify a real threat, of a malicious attacker operating many nodes, if there are so many other cases of not-specified families.
The "MetallicaFan1, MetallicaFan2,.." nodes might not be a problem, because no one with a malicious attempt would name nodes like that. But they are an indication, that there might be a bunch of other nodes, without any such strong sings, but which are also operated by one single individual. Because obviously, it's a very common mistake in configuration.
There might be feasible techniques to find suspicious groups of relays, but with all this non specified families, this would be rather pointless.
aurel
aurel
On 9 January 2012 23:39, Javier Bassi <javierbassi@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Jan 9, 2012 at 7:13 PM, Aurel W. <aurel.w@gmail.com> wrote:
Shouldn't this be treated more seriously? There are literally over 100 high bandwidth relays, which should specify a family but which don't. If you monitor a client, it is very frequently that circuits are built where two relays are clearly controlled by the same person.
As a first try I mailed to two contact email addresses, but I haven't got any response.
In the end its the same. Relay operators who are willing to place MyFamily in their torrc file are not the ones that are going to try to identify you. Malicious relays trying to de-anonimize people are not going to use MyFamily for obvious reasons, and also they will not choose an obvious nick sequence like MetallicaFan1, MetallicaFan2,etc So it seems to me this option has only theoretical benefit, but in practice it's naive. Or maybe I'm missing something _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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Message: 4 Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 18:00:59 -0800 From: Damian Johnson <atagar1@gmail.com> To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] not specified families Message-ID: <CAJdkzEOp711+5EOscFguTbS3DUDdVi3tEaPOOD3UbUGXtKhihw@mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Wouldn't it be possible to code the Tor clients to not build circuits using relays in the same /24 or with "similar" names?
Tor already avoids using multiple relays in a given /16 subnet. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/path-spec.txt#l184
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Message: 5 Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 05:04:42 +0100 From: Sebastian Urbach <sebastian@urbach.org> To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-relays] New authority Message-ID: <20120110040444.AC7731006006A@ccc-hanau.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-15"
Hi,
freedompenguin v3 orport=9001 AC0AF18E61A3660B1F3BAC9FF9DF061D9E446735
May someone add the data to the add_default_trusted_dirservers() function in config.c, using the syntax "v3ident=<fingerprint>".
Thanks.
Btw. i respond pretty fast to server / network issues ;-)
-- Mit freundlichen Gr??en / Yours sincerely
Sebastian Urbach
-------------------------------------------------------- Religion is something left over from the infancy of our intelligence, it will fade away as we adopt reason and science as our guidelines. --------------------------------------------------------
Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970), British philosopher, logician, mathematician, historian, and social critic.
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Jeffrey Ye