I don't understand why you wouldn't just ask people to send you the entire line so they don't need to split and sort it themselves. Anyway; here is a script to automate that

tail -n1 /var/log/tor.log | cut -d: -f4- | tr , '\n' | sort -nr | head -n3

Regards, Sjon

On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 1:39 PM, Karsten Loesing karsten@torproject.org wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1

Hi relay and bridge operators,

want to help us design hardware capabilities of a Torouter device?

At the Florence hackfest I was asked for the typical number of RSA operations performed by a relay or bridge, say, per day. We're mostly interested in home-run relays and bridges on DSL lines and similar, because that's where Torouter devices will be deployed, too. So, Amunet and TorServers are out here. :)

Tor has a built-in feature to count PK operations. If one sends a USR1 signal to the tor process, it writes a line like this to its log file (though this line comes from a client):

Jul 10 18:31:22.904 [info] PK operations: 0 directory objects signed, 0 directory objects verified, 0 routerdescs signed, 2968 routerdescs verified, 216 onionskins encrypted, 0 onionskins decrypted, 30 client-side TLS handshakes, 0 server-side TLS handshakes, 0 rendezvous client operations, 0 rendezvous middle operations, 0 rendezvous server operations.

The number we're most interested in is "onionskins decrypted," but maybe there are other high numbers that are worth considering.

If you run a relay or bridge at home, run these four steps:

1. Make sure the relay or bridge is running for at least 24 hours

(longer is fine, shorter may skew results)

2. Send the process a USR1 signal, e.g., kill -USR1 $pid

3. Look for the log line above

4. Reply to this email with

a) the relay's or bridge's nickname, b) the first four hex characters of its fingerprint, c) the log time and timezone, d) the top-3 PK operations by numbers.

An example result could be:

gabelmoo F204 Jul 10 18:31:22.904 CEST 12345 onionskins decrypted 2968 routerdescs verified 216 onionskins encrypted

Thanks for your help!

Once I have some results, I'll look up relays and bridges in the descriptor archive and post results to this list.

Of course, if someone has more thoughts on measuring how many PK ops a relay or bridge does, please say so! :)

Thanks, Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

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Japnonymous E47B Jul 13 18:37:47.000 EDT 31992 routerdescs verified 81561 onionskins decrypted 54798 server-side TLS handshakes

On 7/13/2012 7:39 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1

Hi relay and bridge operators,

want to help us design hardware capabilities of a Torouter device?

At the Florence hackfest I was asked for the typical number of RSA operations performed by a relay or bridge, say, per day. We're mostly interested in home-run relays and bridges on DSL lines and similar, because that's where Torouter devices will be deployed, too. So, Amunet and TorServers are out here. :)

Tor has a built-in feature to count PK operations. If one sends a USR1 signal to the tor process, it writes a line like this to its log file (though this line comes from a client):

Jul 10 18:31:22.904 [info] PK operations: 0 directory objects signed, 0 directory objects verified, 0 routerdescs signed, 2968 routerdescs verified, 216 onionskins encrypted, 0 onionskins decrypted, 30 client-side TLS handshakes, 0 server-side TLS handshakes, 0 rendezvous client operations, 0 rendezvous middle operations, 0 rendezvous server operations.

The number we're most interested in is "onionskins decrypted," but maybe there are other high numbers that are worth considering.

If you run a relay or bridge at home, run these four steps:

1. Make sure the relay or bridge is running for at least 24 hours

(longer is fine, shorter may skew results)

2. Send the process a USR1 signal, e.g., kill -USR1 $pid

3. Look for the log line above

4. Reply to this email with

a) the relay's or bridge's nickname,
b) the first four hex characters of its fingerprint,
c) the log time and timezone,
d) the top-3 PK operations by numbers.

An example result could be:

gabelmoo F204 Jul 10 18:31:22.904 CEST 12345 onionskins decrypted 2968 routerdescs verified 216 onionskins encrypted

Thanks for your help!

Once I have some results, I'll look up relays and bridges in the descriptor archive and post results to this list.

Of course, if someone has more thoughts on measuring how many PK ops a relay or bridge does, please say so! :)

Thanks, Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQAAjVAAoJEEk5d4GsWvIjWbMH/ilEf4dQrWqdFuZ5lYlWBnSb PAd/ru2ygGFswW4CeWWNKNnkxVd+Dcd9smVjVcpUIxlrEeMXzrZqsICre992Cjsd RjyXBnKIdwInwdVOi5ZyuWbmozCTbn5Oh3Bd47XFMDLNZIgC9itCdlGkU9Mw6bKB KO7QfbtQCTjlBEe/4mYmpW4/H+NaG5V8b3ByWtuAJz614cxckPgR2UxnEtYQXm7p TCRh/FC2jnc+7MrQZxBd6V6zLrudtdLCNLwdchGt7YBPMV3tyryvV6q/8v9ZY5jP VQTW6pKb5kVH1drL4M7oCJtt7bDnxhOGg76C7uBjWiXoaYUp4zyfeTdc57FkreM= =4Ex+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Thus spake Karsten Loesing (karsten@torproject.org):

At the Florence hackfest I was asked for the typical number of RSA operations performed by a relay or bridge, say, per day. We're mostly interested in home-run relays and bridges on DSL lines and similar, because that's where Torouter devices will be deployed, too. So, Amunet and TorServers are out here. :)

Dude, if crypto acceleration works out on these things, 8 of them shoved in a 1U space might be cheaper to deploy than a beefy 8-core 1U machine. Of course, most sane datacenters might consider this a fire hazard, unless we can create some sort of safe racking harness for them...

Tor has a built-in feature to count PK operations. If one sends a USR1 signal to the tor process, it writes a line like this to its log file (though this line comes from a client):

Jul 10 18:31:22.904 [info] PK operations: 0 directory objects signed, 0 directory objects verified, 0 routerdescs signed, 2968 routerdescs verified, 216 onionskins encrypted, 0 onionskins decrypted, 30 client-side TLS handshakes, 0 server-side TLS handshakes, 0 rendezvous client operations, 0 rendezvous middle operations, 0 rendezvous server operations.

Of course, if someone has more thoughts on measuring how many PK ops a relay or bridge does, please say so! :)

What does the log line mean? It looks like these are counts since startup? I assume your plan is to divide by the total uptime of the relay?

Does SIGHUP clear them? Can they get cleared in other sitations?

Loki https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/088ADAB38DA02BD83286872120F85259D44DED88 088A Wed Jul 18 02:58:22 GMT 2012 3620058 onionskins decrypted 1258679 server-side TLS handshakes 544478 client-side TLS handshakes

(lil late, sorry) -kupo

On 07/13/2012 11:39 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1

Hi relay and bridge operators,

want to help us design hardware capabilities of a Torouter device?

At the Florence hackfest I was asked for the typical number of RSA operations performed by a relay or bridge, say, per day. We're mostly interested in home-run relays and bridges on DSL lines and similar, because that's where Torouter devices will be deployed, too. So, Amunet and TorServers are out here. :)

Tor has a built-in feature to count PK operations. If one sends a USR1 signal to the tor process, it writes a line like this to its log file (though this line comes from a client):

Jul 10 18:31:22.904 [info] PK operations: 0 directory objects signed, 0 directory objects verified, 0 routerdescs signed, 2968 routerdescs verified, 216 onionskins encrypted, 0 onionskins decrypted, 30 client-side TLS handshakes, 0 server-side TLS handshakes, 0 rendezvous client operations, 0 rendezvous middle operations, 0 rendezvous server operations.

The number we're most interested in is "onionskins decrypted," but maybe there are other high numbers that are worth considering.

If you run a relay or bridge at home, run these four steps:

1. Make sure the relay or bridge is running for at least 24 hours

(longer is fine, shorter may skew results)

2. Send the process a USR1 signal, e.g., kill -USR1 $pid

3. Look for the log line above

4. Reply to this email with

a) the relay's or bridge's nickname,
b) the first four hex characters of its fingerprint,
c) the log time and timezone,
d) the top-3 PK operations by numbers.

An example result could be:

gabelmoo F204 Jul 10 18:31:22.904 CEST 12345 onionskins decrypted 2968 routerdescs verified 216 onionskins encrypted

Thanks for your help!

Once I have some results, I'll look up relays and bridges in the descriptor archive and post results to this list.

Of course, if someone has more thoughts on measuring how many PK ops a relay or bridge does, please say so! :)

Thanks, Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQAAjVAAoJEEk5d4GsWvIjWbMH/ilEf4dQrWqdFuZ5lYlWBnSb PAd/ru2ygGFswW4CeWWNKNnkxVd+Dcd9smVjVcpUIxlrEeMXzrZqsICre992Cjsd RjyXBnKIdwInwdVOi5ZyuWbmozCTbn5Oh3Bd47XFMDLNZIgC9itCdlGkU9Mw6bKB KO7QfbtQCTjlBEe/4mYmpW4/H+NaG5V8b3ByWtuAJz614cxckPgR2UxnEtYQXm7p TCRh/FC2jnc+7MrQZxBd6V6zLrudtdLCNLwdchGt7YBPMV3tyryvV6q/8v9ZY5jP VQTW6pKb5kVH1drL4M7oCJtt7bDnxhOGg76C7uBjWiXoaYUp4zyfeTdc57FkreM= =4Ex+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays