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Hello Yawning,
We need to confirm this: is a relay holding TLS connections to the majority of the other relays?
On a relay with over 100 days of uptime (middle relay) Stable, HSDir, etc. I have (# netstat -a | wc -l) 1942 connections. Another one, with less uptime just has 548 connections. These relays have a small consensus weight. A guard with good consensus weight has much more, but anyway under the ~6400 (total number of relays in the consensus).
On 7/26/2015 7:48 PM, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 16:11:56 +0200 nusenu nusenu@openmailbox.org wrote:
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[split from 'Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption']
Ok.
I'm of the opinion that it may be worth adding code to pin relay identities to IP addresses on the DirAuth side so that consensus weight and flag assignment gets totally reset if the ORPort IP changes, but if there's too much churn already it may cause more trouble than it's worth.
I hope such code will not be added, because it renders relays on dynamic IPs basically useless. In the past ~week only there were
1000 fingerprints (<3% cw fraction) using more than one IP
address (in that timeframe)
Hey neat, numbers, thanks. <3% cw doesn't seem that bad.
I will reiterate that such a thing only will become viable once the bandwidth measurement stuff sees massive improvement (and it is being worked on), so this isn't a short term thing, and is just an idea.
I question the usefulness of most of the relays running on residential lines in the first place for other reasons (Eg: most consumer routers are crap, and will probably not be able to simultaneously maintain a connection to every single other relay + bridge, which is rather unhealthy to the network overall. Being able to measure this and delist/reduce consensus weight here would be good as well.).
If the relay's IP is constantly changing significantly faster than the Guard rotation interval (needs more numbers here), I'm not sure if they make great Guards, but this is an arma/asn type question since they think more about Guards than I do.
Under a Tor that has the sort of pinning behavior I envision, a relay that changes an IP once in a blue moon still remains useful, a relay that changes an IP frequently (for some definition of frequently) will be used as a middle only (which is still useful).
Regards,