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This of course would be part of the aim. If people can even just suggest providers, we can get in touch with them (if we can get an @torproject.org address for such things it'd be even better). Plus, if we log communications with them we can try work together on convincing hosts with additional assurances/information as needed. This means we'll be adding more hosts who'll allow Tor and therefore great ISP diversity.
As Roger pointed out, with people hopping between ISP's and not challenging it when they are given troubles people are being forced into a narrower pool every time.
Re: Tapping IXPs. This would not be difficult to do on a European scale for example and I am quite sure GCHQ already has done this. Almost every IXP in the UK is controlled by LINX so it only takes a single compromise in them to control virtually all points between UK backbones. I know the same is true also for the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and France. Unfortunately this is an infrastructure challenge and really whilst it's great to have diversity, I think working around IXP's is going to create an even greater bottleneck.
- -T
On 13/10/2014 08:13, Lunar wrote:
Thomas White:
Anyone with access to create a new page on the list and we can add subsections to a new page containing the dated responses from each company on their policy towards Tor hosting.
Sounds like a good idea but anybody working on this should keep in mind that diversity is crucial. Until we get better autonomous systems awareness in Tor path selection, I tend to sweat looking at the current situation: https://metrics.torproject.org/bubbles.html#as
Almost all meaningful relays in a handful of networks means easier job for an adversary. Be it one of the big ISP, a collusion of several of these ISPs, or an agency taping Internet eXchange Point.
Please aim for new providers. (Yes, it's going to be more expensive than OVH.)
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