No problem.
You should default to full disk / partition encryption.
The ArchLinux Wiki has (as usual) a great article on this:
https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Encrypting_devic...
Also make sure to not use the standard hash library (SHA256) but SHA512 instead, and also use argon2id as PBKDF as it's slower and thus harder to brute-force your boot password.
This way your new provider will not be able to obtain your new keys.
Also, even if the old provider did indeed dump your HDD a while ago,
the first / "real" relay to boot up with one descriptor / secret_key gets favored, the other / "fake" I believe I read a while back will not be allowed on to the network, but take this with a grain of salt.
-GH
On Friday, October 4th, 2024 at 11:51 PM, Osservatorio Nessuno via tor-relays tor-relays@lists.torproject.org wrote:
Hi, thanks both for your input.
On 03/10/2024 21:24, boldsuck via tor-relays wrote:
But: FallbackDir can also move to another provider/host. Simply copy the Tor keys of the instance to the new host. I've done that several times.
While we could, I would think it is not a great security practice migrate keys that were on an old, non updated provider cluster when building a new node elsewhere. That would double the risk of someone else having the secret keys (old provider, new provider instead of just the new provider).
Giulio _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays