On 6 Aug 2017, at 02:38, Alexander Nasonov alnsn@yandex.ru wrote:
Ralph Seichter wrote:
I moved a Tor relay to new hardware, keeping the keys. Both old and new server are located in Germany and provided by the same hosting company. After the latest Atlas update, I was surprised to see that the IPv4 address is listed as belonging to an AS in Ukraine. A little more digging returned Guangzhou, China, as the supposed location based on the server's IPv6 address.
A bit off-topic but after updating the client to 0.3.0.10 I noticed that torstatus.rueckgr.at some times reports US based exits which are excluded by my config (ExcludeExitNodes {US}).
Different GeoIP sources have different country allocations.
Also, this option only blocks exit nodes with ORPort addresses in the US.
For example, I run an exit in Canada, where some addresses were allocated from an Canadian block, and others were allocated from a US block. So if I wanted to, I could ORPort on a Canadian address, and Exit on a US one.
Not a big deal for me but GeoIP manupulation is a potential attack vector to reveal identities of people who try to avoid certain countries.
Behaving differently to most tor clients has always been a fingerprinting vector.
We need more research on how to exclude some nodes for some users safely. (It might not even be possible to do it safely.)
T
-- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
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