-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello. tor＠rehcamp.de wrote:
First of all: Is this already a bad idea? Do you seperate tor relays and personal infrastructure physically or in VMs instead of containers?
It really depends on your setup and what its primary purpose is. If you are planning to run multiple high-capacity relays and that is the whole purpose of your setup, then I wouldn't use containers due to incurred overhead. But there's nothing fundamentally wrong with running one that way. You don't even need to run it in a container: On Debian at least, the daemon will run unprivileged and with an AppArmor sandbox.
Now, as netcup is my provider and they seem to tolerate exit nodes, I am thinking about allowing exits. I assume this would increase visibility of my server and maybe attract more attention.
More than a decade ago, this might have been an issue back before Tor was mainstream. Nowadays, most people who are likely to encounter your IP, including IP reputation databases, know what Tor is. Thousands of people around the world run exits, so it's not going to draw personal attention, just automated attention (e.g. DMCA notices, but as you say, Netcup is tolerant of that).
Do you think this is a reason not to open the relay for exits?
No, it should be fine unless there are other circumstances in play where you would want to hide the fact that the server is running an exit. If all your other domains are personal use (i.e. there are no business policies that are being violated if you run corporate infrastructure), then there's no significant problem. That is, unless you run a self-hosted mail server. In that case, outgoing emails will always get marked as spam since they'll share the IP of an exit! I'm not familiar with Netcup's policies (I don't use them because they already make up a significant fraction of Tor's bandwidth), but you will want to make sure that your data is backed up, just on the off chance that the service is terminated for abuse.
Do you think this would be needed/enough? In this case, I would restrict the relay to IPv6-only exits.
Relays can't be IPv6-only yet. Even if you can use IPv4 for your ORPort and IPv6 for the actual exiting traffic, the ORPort is public. I think there's really no need to do that. It might actually make things worse if some site sees the IPv6 address and naïvely searches a database of ORPorts, fails to find that IPv6 there (because you are only exposing an IPv4 ORPort), and concludes that it's not an exit but is genuinely a malicious host. If anything, you *want* the extra "attention" because it screams "I am not in control of this traffic, I am just an exit relay". All the usual exit relay caveats apply, of course, but so long as you are running on a provider that is exit-friendly and you don't care about the reputation of that IP address (which is only really relevant if you are self-hosting a mail server there), it sholud be completely fine to run an exit relay. But please remember to either use Netcup's own DNS server (if it has one) or a DoT/DoH server, not unencrypted 8.8.8.8. I personally run my own local recursive DNS resolver (Unbound), but that requires a second IPv4 address and you only have one. I'd be happy to open it up over DoT so you can use it. It uses DNSSEC so it doesn't have to be trusted. And thank you for considering to run an exit! Regards, forest -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEARYKAB0WIQQtr8ZXhq/o01Qf/pow+TRLM+X4xgUCaVXTVwAKCRAw+TRLM+X4 xmgwAP4t1PxAaHrnxdYgFRHsyEqQjOU7FR/ouhU3S3Ny2rmYMQEAt/aKm1jnG/F5 EuveOiggDibQeUFy1o8lfqVqwQ2fagA= =uUpH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----