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On 08/07/15 08:56, josh@tucker.wales wrote:
On 8 Jul 2015, at 04:56, Zack Weinberg zackw@cmu.edu wrote: I may have gotten this project mixed up with the one that is replacing Atlas/Onionoo, for which a "dashboard" showing the relay's status at the present time is the entry point. Still, I think that an investigator might indeed want to know whether the behavior of the relay is different now than it was at the time of the incident. For instance, there would be no point to complaining about exit traffic emanating from a relay that *was* an exit, but isn't anymore. And a relay that was only an exit for a brief window of time, that happens to coincide with an incident, should be suspected to have been hacked.
I don't think this is information ExoneraTor should provide.
I agree that the investigator might need to know the differences in the configuration of the relay between "now" and "then", but ExoneraTor isn't a config diff utility. There are tools available to confirm the current status of a relay, and I don't feel we should be duplicating this functionality again in ExoneraTor.
I'm with Joshua here. ExoneraTor specifically asks for a date and an IP address and returns details about relays running on that address on or within a day of that date. Since then, relays could have switched from exit to non-exit or back and they could have changed IP addresses.
However, I'm still unclear what states the Exit column should contain. States like "Never" or "Former" shouldn't be part of those for the reason above, but it's plausible that more than just "Yes" and "No" would help. The goal here is to simplify, but not to oversimplify. Thoughts?
All the best, Karsten