bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays wrote on 3/25/25 16:23:
Thank you mpan, I agree, is the problem that I am using:
- the same entry node for every circuit?
- entry node can be traced to me directly, because it's hosted in my geographic
location (at home)?
I agree that blending your traffic with other users is security by obscurity and it's not worth the cost of weakening tor network model but what if you used tor normally, not through your own bridge, but through "regular" randomly chosen 3-hop circuits and at the same time run a tor relay (entry/middle) that regularly hosts tor traffic of other users is it incorrect to assume that this would add some level obscurity that would benefit your anonymity? This wouldn't require weakening the tor circuit model anymore
That's pretty much my situation. I have a non-exit node at home, and I use sometimes Tor normally, for example with Torbrowser, who doesn't know it's sitting on a tor node and connects with the usual 3 hops.
Should anyone look at the traffic at my ip, he would see a constant flow towards other Tor nodes, and wouldn't know when it's also me browsing.
I really don't see any danger in this. I believe it would be worse if my personal Tor traffic popped up at specific moments among normal traffic. An observer would at least know when I'm Tor-ing. I don't see how this scenario would be better. Am I wrong?
My two cents, bye, Marco