On 08.01.2018 23:59, Dave Warren wrote:
On 2018-01-08 14:09, Tortilla wrote:
On Mon, January 8, 2018 11:25 am, Dave Warren wrote:
On 2018-01-08 03:21, Florentin Rochet wrote:
Perhaps in the case that the HS operator is not trying to mask the HS location, the act of mixing public relay traffic can be nothing but a *help* to defeat anyone trying to correlate traffic coming to the HS with traffic emanating from any one client.
Yes, if the HS operator does not want to mask the HS location, then it is all good. For that purpose, I agree that the warning message should be changed.
Indeed. I run some public resources (e.g. torproject.org mirror) on a public URL with a .onion site as well. Nothing is intended to be hidden, I simply want the content of anything I mirror to be available to Tor users without relying on an exit.
I think the real issue here is once more the wording "hidden service" for something which is, in your case, not intended to be hidden.
I believe thats why the term "Onion Service" was introduced.
A foolproof solution would be, that a relay complains and refuses to start if a "hidden onion service" is configured on the same instance. But would run without warning with "public onion services".
I have no idea if a distinction between "public" and "hidden" onion services is planned or if its just change of wording until now.