OVH are not monitoring:
I did not see it in the T&Cs that you only run on Tor with OVH on dedicated servers. I have been running an exit on OVH VPS for many months now at 17TB a month and not a squeak from OVH, and not a single complaint forwarded to me so far. The Tor is open to many 1000s of ports but not the major obvious abused ones, and a very limited subnet for 80, 443 wide open. I am sure if I opened up port 80 worldwide complaints would start and attention would be drawn to it so they could initiate immediate shutdown.
Gerry
-----Original Message----- From: tor-relays tor-relays-bounces@lists.torproject.org On Behalf Of Nathaniel Suchy Sent: 14 January 2019 03:23 To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] community team highlights: Relay Advocacy
OVH only allows Tor relays and exits on their dedicated servers, it's not allowed on VPS and Cloud. I do not believe they're actively checking though, you could probably get away with a non-exit relay, or even an exit relay on the reduced-reduced exit policy (brush off the occasional abuse / dmca notice with what anti-hack (abuse dept) wants to hear) and nothing occur. I do not think they would take any issue with you hosting a bridge (maybe it's a good idea to ask first?).
Back before Conrad Rockenhaus disappeared from the lists and shutdown his company, we ran several Tor Exit Relays on a few dedicated servers then private cloud. It's my understanding OVH suspended one account saying too many complaints then backtracked on it. Your milege may vary, however if someone for instance sent a DoS attack, saying it was a Tor Exit wouldn't help you and you'd be perma suspended from OVH likely without their mercy.
Cordially, Nathaniel Suchy
Jan 13, 2019, 4:54 PM by grarpamp@gmail.com:
communicating with OVH regarding relays without contactinfo
Is it *really* a good idea to poke OVH over this? in their ToS I feel this can backfire in a bad way is easier to ban all this "Tor" entirely?
Though there can be some context, in general harassing and busywork for ISP is indeed not good. Especially when Tor has recourse and discipline of simply dropping the nodes from consensus with log referral. That's the better way, nodes will get clue eventually.
Another bettwer way is creating anti-Sybil web of trusts and node selection meta metrics that operators and users can contribute to and choose among. Which is still an open project ripe and waiting since *years* to be done by whoever wants to explore it. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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