On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 05:30:37PM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
Consider another case. Users have often complained that running a tor
relay results in their IP addresses being blocked by all manner of services around the Internet. The providers of those services say they have suffered attacks originating from tor relays. The project's response was to create an automatically, frequently updated list of IP addresses of exit relays and make that list available for download by anyone wishing to block traffic from tor exits, while allowing traffic from all other relays. That list of addresses suffers the same problem of not including alternative IP addresses for those relays. Even worse, troublesome connections from those alternative addresses *can* be traced back, in some cases, to the exit relay. Once those services have identified the offending traffic as coming from a machine they had been promised by the tor project would be in the downloadable list of exit relay addresses, they may decide that they had been deceived by the tor project, which could lead to many bad things in the future.
I think we might have to agree to disagree about a lot of these topics, but I wanted to correct this one.
The bulk exit list: https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py along with TorDNSEL is designed to handle exactly this situation, and it does it pretty well.
--Roger