Thank you mpan, I agree, is the problem that I am using:
- the same entry node for every circuit?
Yes
- entry node can be traced to me directly, because it's hosted in my geographic
location (at home)?
Yes up until word “because.” Geographic location is irrelevant or only tangentially relevant. The entry node itself is the identity.
but what if you used tor normally, not through your own bridge, but through "regular" randomly chosen 3-hop circuits and at the same time run a tor relay (entry/middle) that regularly hosts tor traffic of other users is it incorrect to assume that this would add some level obscurity that would benefit your anonymity? This wouldn't require weakening the tor circuit model anymore Yes, this is correct. The more Tor traffic goes through the machine
that identifies you, the more confused an adversary is. It also makes naïve correlation attacks impossible,⁽¹⁾ and increases cost of more advanced ones. ____ ⁽¹⁾ Ones incapable of dealing with noisy datapoints.