On March 9, 2015 11:16:34 PM yl tor@yl.ms wrote:
Am 09.03.2015 um 22:53 schrieb Markus Hitter:
It certainly wasn't meant this way. The point of these considerations is:
of what use is an anonymous network if virtually no website accepts connections from it? Right: it's of not much use, with most of the public internet blocked you can communicate inside the network, only.
To take your webmail example: if the site admin decides there's too much
spam coming from Tor connections and blocks the entire network, then you're done with your webmailing, even with full freedom inside Tor its self.
So wouldn't the correct solution also be to educate the administrators of such services? I mean the only reason, why there is more Tor-Exit-IPs in the abuse log than any other single unique IP is that there is tens of thousand of users using each Tor-Exit.
+1
I had such a case some days ago on an exit relay, someone with an Google account complained that there where abusive logins from the Tor Exits IP, so what should I do then? Block the whole login page domain of Google in my exit? Surely that is not the right solution if there is a few thousand users not trying to brute force that one account. I didn't even get any more reply from the Google user when I asked if this was only a single event or if it was multiple repeated.
As such the only solution can be to play nice with public sites. I don't
mean to have all answers to all problems here. Opening only selected ports, a common practice, could also be seen as censoring, still it's generally considered to be acceptable. Apparently it's not enough to gain a good reputation.
Sure, but always answer to the abuse emails and try to explain, if you receive a few a week then prepare some text modules that you just copy an paste, make it look unique and many people will understand.
+1