On 2018-01-08 16:08, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 03:59:25PM -0700, Dave Warren wrote:
Even if Tor didn't supply any relay statistics, a curious and enterprising individual could "explore" by seeing what happens to a particular onion when one launches a DoS attack against an external IP that one believes might be connected to the .onion service.
Yep. If you want to go a step further, check out this paper: https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#remote-traffic-pets12 where they investigate inducing congestion on a target IP address to learn *what web page it's loading*.
Turns out the attack is only effective in certain situations, but the fact that it's worth taking seriously at all is bad news for the Internet as a whole.
I forgot about that one! Not a surprise that it's possible in certain circumstances, I suppose.
Nonetheless, a hidden service should be relatively immune if the IP address isn't known (and isn't trivially determined, such as also hosting a relay).