Also, when a Tor relay goes offline, the traffic is redistributed across the Tor network. It is unlikely you would receive the high speed traffic of a node just because it went offline, unless a few HIGHLY unlikely variables occur.
Also, all of the clients will be completely disconnected which were using the Tor server; it is impossible to "re-patch" the connections, given the anonymous nature of Tor.
On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 4:07 PM, Austin Bentley ab6d9@mst.edu wrote:
Hey bud,
Your adsl connection has a low advertised bandwidth, and doesn't make many connections with regards to tor; thus, the CPU usage is correct. Look up your server's fingerprint or nickname on Tor Globe to see how much of the tor network travels through your server.
CPU load is usually associated with a lot of bandwidth or a inefficiency in the server. I've heard that a 100mbit tor server using full 12.5MB/s up/down will saturate the core dedicated to the Tor process; this is presumably why a lot of servers run multiple Tor instances on different cores and IP addresses. However, in your case, it is likely
The large amount of connections is generally caused by a few things:
- You've been running a very stable server for a long period of time and
have sufficient bandwidth to provide connectivity for a large number of clients; additional flags, such as Guard, HSDir, V2Dir, and Exit will likely result in more connections. This is not likely with your server, given your advertised bandwidth is only 68.44kb/s. 2. A single client is using your server for a lot of connections. 3. An anomaly/attack in the Tor network (somewhat unlikely, I don't know if any have been documented.) 4. An attack against your server. This is very hard to do through the Tor network; an attack against a Tor relay using Tor is an attack against all Tor relays. HOWEVER, they could be attacking your port which you use to host your tor server.
Just for reference, here's my tor stats: Advertised B/W: ~4MB/s Connections (555 inbound, 5 outbound, 93 exit, 1 socks, 5 circuit, 1 control) Tor is averaging 9%-13% CPU usage; 198MB memory.
More info on my server:
https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/EF84089646304169F439A8F473742D74F027BA1...
I hope this answered your question, if not, send a reply and hopefully I'll reply sometime.
On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 2:22 PM, webmaster webmaster@defcon-cc.dyndns.org wrote:
Am 03.12.2014 um 19:04 schrieb Toralf Förster:
On 12/03/2014 06:17 PM, webmaster wrote:
At first I thought: Fuck, someone intruded into my machine. But after some looking through Arm I found many (>100) INBOUND
connections.
"many" ?
I do have usually something like this : Connections (782 inbound, 458 outbound, 245 exit, 1 control): for and advertised bandwidth of 4 MBit, so >100 are quite normal.
Probably you should raise the ulimit, I do have for da dedicated server
(and Gentoo) :
tfoerste@tor-relay ~ $ cat /etc/conf.d/tor # # Set the file limit rc_ulimit="-n 30000"
I'm running the server through a relatively slow adsl connection (6,9 MBit/s down, 733 kBit/s up). Advertised Bandwidth: 68.44 kB/s.
My ulimit is set to 1024 (os default). I will keep the ulimit setting at the default value because i see now reason for increasing it.
Actually my server handles 28 inbound, 5 outbound and 14 circuits. The load is approx. 2%.
From my point of view this strange behavior isn't common for my tor server because usually the cpu load of the tor process is below 10%.
What happens to the tor network when a tor server with high bandwidth goes off-line? Maybe this could be a reason?
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