I'll hijack the response.... I'm a sysadmin, an unloved Windows one. My unwanted $0.02 are:
- Windows installer (omg, Windows, the evil one which if you really want greater adoption is the answer! Oh smokes, someone said it!
- change the architecture so running behind nat works (this is probably the #1 limit factor for increasing relays). Every tom, dick, and harry could then add bandwidth via every internet circuit. It would be insane!
-Ben
From: Damian Busby Sent: Saturday, July 4, 2015 7:21 PM To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Reply To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] unflagged BAD EXIT nodes
Sorry for hijacking, but I wasn't sure where best to put this.
As a programmer, where should I start if I am considering lending my time to the tor project? While I feel that the BAD EXIT issue needs some love, I defer to those with more knowledge on the state of things to direct my efforts.
Is there a online resource I should peruse, or is it more of a secret society complete with hazing and chanting?
Once again, sorry for the interruption.
The Other Damian
On Sat, Jul 4, 2015, 12:12 PM Damian Johnson <atagar@torproject.orgmailto:atagar@torproject.org> wrote:
I find it more worrying that we do not "hear" about the 'more serious attacks' that keep them busy and don't allow them to look into i.e. 'AviatoChortler' (even after a few weeks). That might mean that there is a constant stream of 'more serious attacks' (without information I can only guess).
... or it could also be that we're simply spread too thin. ;)
Bad relay detection is a space that doesn't traditionally get much focus. Presently Philipp is the only person investing time here, and he both has a day job and would prefer to do more interesting things (like write code!) in his free time.
As I see it there's three areas that need to be improved in this space...
1. Bad relay detection. Philipp's ExitMap [1] and my naive sybil checker [2] are the only automated checks I'm aware of right now. That leaves a lot of room for improvement.
2. Openness. Traditionally there's been some contention about where to draw the line between openness and secrecy. Personally this is what turned me off to this space [3]. Thankfully Philipp's moving us toward being a little less secretive. [4]
3. Responsiveness. To get a relay flagged we need to persuade directory authority operators to manually intervene by editing their torrc. I get the impression all the dirauths that vote on BadExit now use Philipp's git repository so hopefully this is better than it once was.
All this is to say 'help welcome!'. If this is a space you truly care about then please make it better! Philipp can best say where more hands would be useful.
Cheers! -Damian
[1] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/spoiled_onions/ [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git/tree/sybil_checker.py [3] see the 'As of April 2013 this list is no longer being maintained' note on https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays [4] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13302 _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.orgmailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays