*any* sounds a little bit too optimistic IMO, but it reduces the risk of being deanonymized (always under the assumption of the threat model).
If family name is correctly defined, Tor ensure you will only use one of those nodes on your circuits.
If family name not correctly defined, Tor project will try to contact operator to define one : https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-December/011112.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-December/011402.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-December/011416.html Without action, nodes may be blacklisted if suspicious. And even if not, /16 restriction will apply, and never 2 nodes on the same /16 will be used.
If attacker nodes have no family name and not in few /16, we are typically in a sybil attack and Tor network tools might report the trouble. https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/phw/sybilhunter.git/ https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-November/ 005252.html
Sure, all those protections are not perfect. Adding new relays few at a time to stay under the sybil attack detection level, without common pattern (IP, / 16, node name, AS…), during a lot of time to control most of the nodes may remain undetected. But currently, seems not the case at least for guard and exit which are well known or documented most of the time or at least for the biggest part of the consensus.
More than money, such undetected attack requires global organisation to subvert and subponea enough people (network admin, sys admin, companies, hardware hosting…) to build it. It's more planetary conspiracy theory than anything else.
Regards,