On 6/26/18 10:29, Nagaev Boris wrote:
On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Matt Traudt pastly@torproject.org wrote:
On 6/26/18 10:16, dave levi wrote:
I'm testing few things in Tor and I noticed that if im changing(from the source code) the number of hop's(nodes) to be more then 3 hop's it work's fine(slowly, but still working) and if im sting only 2 hop's its still works great. but, when i'm setting only 1 hop, i can open the Tor-browser but i can't use it(Tor-browser) to visit site(regular site or onion site too). so im thinking maybe the Tor-network have protected from users who are using 1 hop?
Yes.
Even before the DoS mitigation stuff, relays wouldn't allow themselves to be used as the only hop in a circuit. Apparently this affects onion service circuits too.
If you want a single-hop proxy, then you don't want Tor.
Matt _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
How does a relay know if there is another relay in the circuit? What if the attacker runs a "relay" locally?
The way a client connects to a relay and the way a relay connects to another relay is different.
Technically the attacker/user could run a relay/bridge locally and connect to that before the remote relay, creating a 2-hop circuit that **might** have performance similar to a 1-hop circuit.
Matt