https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=17ecd04fde2fd98b0cca3afb251...
On 10 December 2014 at 17:57, Logforme m7527@abc.se wrote:
On 2014-12-10 08:31, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Careful with your conclusion there -- because of memory fragmentation, the process can still hold the memory even when Tor has freed the memory.
htop currently shows 3622/3858 Mem used and 1545/3136 Swap used. (if I remember correctly it's usually less than 1000 Mem and 0 Swap used). So the attacker (intentional or accidental) actually managed to make Tor take all free memory on the machine before the MaxMemInQueues function stepped in. And now I have no way to release that memory short of restarting tor. If I used the machine for something apart from tor it would have been a successful attack. Guess I need to set the MaxMemInQueues parameter to something other than 0, maybe 2GB? What's the "reasonable default" for MaxMemInQueues? Some percentage of total RAM? _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays