News: Package is at Tor 0.2.8.7, which was released yesterday.
* Roger Dingledine arma@mit.edu [2016-08-25 00:33:14 -0400]:
Nice idea!
Other people here have very valid points about the security and maintability side of things, but I'll add another point: It looks like the conservative defaults you mention are a BandwidthRate and BandwithBurst of 75 KBytes. That tiny level of rate limiting basically ensures that none of these relays will ever get the Fast flag, so they will never be used by actual users.
I had that same thought a few days ago. Thank you for the note. That's just the kind of feedback I wanted.
http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~privacy-squad/+junk/tor-middle-relay-snap/revis...
I wonder if your project would be better at producing bridges? https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#RelayOrBridge Especially since you could include obfs4 (or even more!) support as part of the bundle.
If you look at the atlas list, you'll see that about 1 out of four are bridges. At startup, it generates keys, and then uses the fingerprint to decide whether to volunteer to be a bridge relay for the rest of its life.
Built in are the obfs4 plugins, and also the firewall helper, and nyx/arm. Your "more!" intrigues me, though. Private mail?