On 01/01/2017 03:42 PM, Andreas Krey wrote:
On Sun, 01 Jan 2017 23:54:03 +0000, Rana wrote: ...
I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of existing ones.
It will not go quite unnoticed when the set of major relays changes substantially over a few months.
True. But prudent adversaries wouldn't put their trusted relays, with guard flags, at risk by doing anything unusual with them. They would use throwaway relays with exit flags to modulate circuit traffic, and then detect that modulation in their guards. Such malicious exits would be detected and banned, but the malicious guards would only be at risk when users became aware of compromise.
That wouldn't work for onion services, however, because there are no exits involved. Something might be doable using rendezvous relays, or perhaps onion directories, but I'm guessing that it would be harder and more obvious. Unfortunately, however, I don't understand the mechanism well enough to have much of an opinion.
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That???s $1million a year to control most of the Tor nodes., You call this "costly"? This amount is a joke, a trifle, petty cash for any US or Russian government agency. FIFTY times this amount is STILL petty cash, so in case you think $20/month is not enough to run a relay, make it $1000 a month.
This assumes that there is only one entity wanting to do that. When there are multiple the game isn't that easy.
Yes, that is a great Tor feature! Dueling adversaries strengthen Tor against each other.
Andreas