Hello!
I've been working on a proposed change to Tor's LTS policies. I've run it by a few people already, and now I've posted it on tor-dev for broader comment. If you're not on tor-dev, you can read it at
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2021-February/014515.html
(summary: If we decide to do this, we will still be able to do LTS releases, but we will backport fewer things to them, and we will make fewer promises about how well they will work on the network.)
I'm especially interested in feedback from packagers here.
best wishes, -- Nick
Hi Nick,
I'm the current maintainer for Tor at SlackBuilds.org; scripts are provided to users so that they can build their own packages on stock systems. Scripts are approved before publication.
* Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org wrote:
Many packagers don't like it, because they have a policy of auditing security backports, and we backport too much to our LTS releases for them to audit carefully.
Auditing such backports is beyond my capabilities. I merely test for functionality in the realm of my personal usage pattern on the last stable Slackware release as well as on -current.
Presently this encompasses running a few private bridges, a relay, and hidden services as needed, and using Tor-browser on Windows & Slackware test-driving a few selected websites.
Here's my approach to testing:
* private bridges test both last stable (like 0.4.4.7) & -alpha/-rc * the relay only tests last stable * with hidden services it's either last stable or -alpha/-rc, there is no def. commitment; mostly a PoC-thingy for non-critical stuff
my approach to 'packaging' is simple, and my motivation behind it kind of resonates partially with your main goal here I think:
* package the last stable release so that folks can test-drive the latest features/security fixes within their scope of use, if they want but also keep former stable releases available through the SBo git repository, for users who know their way with git.
We propose the following release statuses:
fine by me.
tor-packagers@lists.torproject.org